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COMING TO GRIPS WITH THE ETHICAL CHALLENGES FOR
CAPITAL POST-CONVICTION REPRESENTATION POSED BY
MARTINEZ V RYAN
John H Blume* and W Bradley Wendel
Abstract
In its groundbreaking decision in Martinez v. Ryan, 556 U.S. 1 (2012),
the Supreme Court of the United States held that inadequate assistance of
post-conviction counsel could be sufficient "cause" to excuse a
procedural default thus allowing a federal court in habeas corpus
proceedings to reach the merits of an otherwise barred claim that an
inmate was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective
assistance of counsel at trial. The upshot of Martinez is that, if state postconviction counsel unreasonably (and prejudicially) fails to raise a viable
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, then there is "cause" (and
likely also prejudice), and thus a gateway to merits' review of the claim
in federal habeas corpus proceedings. This is potentially a good thing for
many habeas petitioners, but creates a serious and as-yet unappreciated
ethical problem for federal habeas counsel who also served as state postconviction counsel. In capital post-conviction cases, the pre-Martinez
preference and practice was for continuity of counsel from state to federal
court. Now that ineffective representation in state post-conviction
proceedings can serve as a basis for review of otherwise defaulted claims,
however, a lawyer may be materially limited in her ability to provide
ongoing representation by the client's interest in asserting an
ineffectiveness claim.
Lawyers who practice in the area of civil litigation or transactional
representation are familiar with these "prior work" conflicts and the
solution to them, which is to obtain the informed consent of the affected
client after full disclosure of the facts that give rise to the conflict and of
the available alternatives. In the capital habeas context, however, the
usual apparatus of professional responsibility law, including the informed
consent doctrine and the potential of malpractice liability for mishandling a conflict, are ill-suited to dealing with the problem thrust upon
petitioners' counsel by Martinez. Ironically, even though the tort doctrine
of malpractice and the rules of professional conduct are both intended to
* Samuel F. Leibowitz Professor of Trial Techniques, Cornell Law School.
** Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. The author gratefully acknowledges the research

funding provided by the Judge Albert Conway Memorial Fund for Legal Research, established by
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protect clients, the rules allow the possibly negligent lawyer to decide
whether client protection requires disclosure and consent, or possibly
withdrawal from representation. Given the significance of ineffective
assistance of counsel in capital cases, however, this kind of selfmonitoring would be intolerable. Hence, the puzzle presented by
Martinez, which recognizes the inability of lawyers to self-monitor, but
fails to provide a mechanism for ensuring that the client's rights are
adequately protected.
This Article suggests, therefore, that petitioners' counsel cannot bear
the sole responsibility for solving the Martinez dilemma. The other
systemic and repeat players-States' attorneys and judges-also have to
do their part. After all, it is the invocation of procedural defenses in an
effort to preclude merits' review of the habeas petitioner's federal
constitutional claims that creates the procedural morass we have
described. This in turn leads to both inefficient litigation and unjust
results. Thus, in most instances, if attorneys for the state agreed-either
on their own or after being "leaned on" by the court-to waive procedural
default and allow the court to proceed to the merits, then litigation would
proceed expeditiously and without the ethical taint of potential and actual
conflicts of interest. If the claims are not bonafide, they will be rejected.
On the other hand, if the issues not previously raised are in fact
meritorious, then there are no true "losers" unless one believes that death
sentences resulting from a trial infected with prejudicial constitutional
error should be carried out. Without some cooperative solution, courts
will be faced with motions for substitution of counsel or the appointment
of independent counsel to evaluate the performance of state postconviction counsel; state attorneys general will have to deal with the
possibility of further delay while the conflict issue is adjudicated. Thus,
the tentatively hopeful conclusion to this exploration of the conundrum
of Martinez is that the institutional actors with a stake in procedures and
outcomes will work together to create an avenue for credible claims of
inadequate state post-conviction representation to be investigated
competently, for clients to be fully informed and involved in the decisionmaking process, and ultimately the client's wishes respected.
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INTRODUCTION

In its groundbreaking decision in Martinez v. Ryan,' the Supreme
Court held that inadequate assistance of state post-conviction counsel
could satisfy the "cause" requirement necessary to allow a federal court
in habeas corpus proceedings to reach the merits of an otherwise
procedurally barred claim alleging that an inmate was deprived of his
Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial.2
That was quite a mouthful, but what does it actually mean? This Article
first attempts to "unpack" the terms, its content, and then explores the
ethical issues the Court's decision poses for attorneys representing
prisoners in federal habeas corpus actions.
A person charged with a crime in state or federal court has a Sixth
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. 3 If the defendant is
indigent, then under most circumstances, she is entitled to courtappointed counsel.4 A defendant is not just entitled to a lawyer; the
lawyer must be competent, or in the Supreme Court's terms, the
defendant (theoretically) has the right to the "effective assistance of
counsel." 5 In most jurisdictions, a defendant who pleads guilty or is
1. 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).
2. Id at 1319-20 ("[Aln attorney's negligence in a postconviction proceeding does not
establish cause .... ).
3. The Sixth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.

4. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340, 345 (1963). In Gideon, the Supreme Court
held that indigent defendants are entitled to court-appointed counsel in criminal cases but did not
specify the precise scope of the right. Id. Subsequently, in Scott v. Illinois, the Court held that a
court cannot sentence a criminal defendant to a term of actual imprisonment "unless the State has
afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel." 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979). A
suspended sentence is considered to be "actual" imprisonment. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S.
654, 657-58, 674 (2002).
5. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970)). A lawyer is not "effective" for Sixth Amendment purposes if the
attorney's performance was both "deficient" (i.e., objectively unreasonable) and "prejudicial"
(i.e., there is a reasonable probability that had the lawyer performed adequately, the result of the
proceeding would have been different). See id. at 687-88, 694. This Article uses the word
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convicted at trial and wishes to assert a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel must do so in state post-conviction proceedings. 6 Every state has,
by one name or another, a post-conviction procedure for persons
adjudicated guilty of a crime to present additional evidence as to why the
court should vacate the conviction or sentence.7 That is where, for the
most part, defendants assert claims of ineffective or inadequate assistance
of counsel. If the inmate is unsuccessful in the state courts, she can ask
the federal courts, via the "great writ" of federal habeas corpus,9 to review
federal constitutional challenges to the conviction or sentence, including
a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.' 0
However, among other obstacles to a federal court vacating a state court
conviction, if the defendant did not present a federal claim to the state
courts during state post-conviction proceedings, then the federal courts
will not entertain the issue due to principles of comity and federalism, or
more simply, respect for state court judgments and the finality of
"theoretically" advisedly. The Strickland standard is widely-and correctly--criticized for
tolerating grossly incompetent representation. See, e.g., John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson,

Gideon Exceptionalism?, 122 YALE L.J. 2126, 2138-39 (2013).
6. See generally John H. Blume, An Introduction to Post-convictionRemedies, Practice
and Procedure in South Carolina,45 S.C. L. REv. 235, 239, 242 (1994) (illustrating that a postconviction proceeding can pertain to the right of counsel).

7. See, e.g., id. at 238, 245 (tracing the history and development of South Carolina's state
post-conviction procedures).

8. The writ of habeas corpus is still sometimes used in South Carolina to challenge the
validity of a conviction or sentence. See id. at 262. The Sixth Amendment does not require states
to appoint counsel in state post-conviction proceedings (but many do); however, an inmate has

the right-if he can afford to do so-to retain counsel. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing an
accused the right "to the Assistance of Counsel for his defence" in criminal prosecutions). But see
Blume & Johnson, supra note 5, at 2138 (noting the difficulties for defendants alleging
deprivation of the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel). For the most
part, state courts push adjudication of ineffective assistance claims to post-conviction proceedings
because, by and large, a court cannot decide such assertions of attorney incompetence simply by
reviewing the "cold" trial record. See Eve Brensike Primus, Effective TrialCounselAfter Martinez
v. Ryan: Focusing on the Adequacies of State Procedures, 122 YALE L.J. 2604, 2609 (2013)
("Because ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims are often predicated on what trial attorneys
failed to do, they frequently require extrarecord development."). Additional evidence is often
needed, such as counsel's reasons for pursuing (or not pursuing) certain courses of action or lines

of defense. See id
9. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 (1963).
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (2012) (mandating when a court may grant an application for
a writ of habeas corpus). Before seeking federal review, the inmate must first present to the state

courts any alleged federal constitutional defects in her conviction or sentence. Id. This is referred
to as the exhaustion-of-state-remedies requirement. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 513, 516
(1982) (discussing the development and scope of the "exhaustion doctrine"). The general purpose
of the rule is to provide-as a matter of comity and federalism-state courts with the first
opportunity to consider claims that call into question the constitutional validity of one of its

criminal convictions. Id. at 518.
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convictions." In the habeas corpus taxonomy, the claim is generally
considered to be "procedurally defaulted" because it was not raised in the
right court at the right time. 1 2 Procedural default precludes a merits'
review of the claim by the federal courts unless the inmate can show
"cause" and "prejudice" for failing to present the claim to the state courts
or a manifest miscarriage of justice (i.e., actual innocence of the
offense). 1 3 "Cause" is generally a reason not attributable to the inmate for
failing to raise the claim earlier,1 4 and "prejudice" in this context means
that the failure to raise the claim earlier (or adequately) had an effect on
the prior proceedings that may have changed the outcome of the trial.' 5
Prior to Martinez, the Court had rejected arguments that failings of
state post-conviction counsel, even shockingly poor representation, could
serve as "cause" for failing to raise a claim properly in state court.' 6 The
Court rejected these arguments primarily because it had concluded that
there was no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in state or federal post-

11. See id. at 518-19 (holding that a total exhaustion rule will encourage state prisoners to

first seek full relief, including relief for federal claims, from the state court).
12. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 83-85 (1977). Other common examples of state

procedural defaults include failing to lodge a contemporaneous objection at trial and failing to
raise a properly preserved claim on direct appeal. See id. at 83 n.8 (citing Henry v. Mississippi,
379 U.S. 443 (1965)); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161 (1996).
13. Gray, 518 U.S. at 162; Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 90-91. It is actually a bit more
complicated than what this Article presented above. The claim could be "unexhausted" (and not
procedurally defaulted) if the state courts allow a state prisoner to file more than one application
for post-conviction relief. The exhaustion-of-state-remedies doctrine requires inmates who file a

federal habeas petition to first present claims of constitutional error to the state courts. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 (2012); Rose, 455 U.S. at 516, 518 ("[O]ne court should defer action on causes properly
within its jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty ... have had an opportunity to pass
upon the matter." (quoting Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950))). But because most states
have a "one bite at the apple" rule for persons seeking post-conviction relief, in most instances,
the claim will be "exhausted" because the inmate does not have a currently available state remedy
and procedurally defaulted because the defendant did not present the claim to the state courts in
post-conviction proceedings. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 98 So. 3d 484, 487 (Miss. Ct. App.

2012) (quoting Dobbs v. State, 18 So. 3d 259, 298 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)).
14. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (explaining that the defendant must
ususually establish "cause" by showing that an "objective factor external to the defense impeded
counsel's efforts").

15. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 289, 291 (1999) (finding that the petitioner did
not show prejudice, which would have excused a procedural default, because the prosecution's
failure to disclose favorable information did not give rise to a reasonable probability of a different
outcome at trial).

16. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 727, 750, 757 (1991) (holding that postconviction counsel's negligent failure to file a timely notice of appeal in a capital post-conviction
proceeding, which led to the procedural default of all of the death-sentenced inmate's claims,

failed to satisfy the "cause" requirement).
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conviction proceedings.1 7 Thus, if there is no right to counsel, then, a
fortiori, there is no right to the effective assistance of counsel.' 8 The
Court then fell back to the default principle that lawyers are generally
regarded as the client's agent.1 9 Therefore, counsel's mistakes are
deemed attributable to the defendant. 20 Although the Court did not make
this reasoning explicit, it could have relied upon the role assigned by rules
of professional conduct to defense counsel to monitor his own
performance, ensure that there are no conflicts of interest, and do
whatever additional work is necessary to acquire the skill required to
render competent performance. 2 1
But in Martinez, the Court changed tack and recognized for the first
time that-as a matter of equity-inadequate assistance of postconviction counsel could, under some circumstances, be "cause" for
failing to raise claims in state post-conviction proceedings. 22 Under what
circumstances though? First, the exception applies only to claims of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 23 If state post-conviction counsel
fails to identify and present other types of common post-conviction
claims, e.g., prosecutorial misconduct in failing to disclose exculpatory
information or juror misconduct-no matter how meritorious the issue
might be-Martinez's equitable exception does not apply. 24 Second, the
17. Id. at 754-55. Every state has state post-conviction procedures, although federal law

does not require them. See Blume, supra note 6, at 241, 258 n.169 (explaining how state courts
chose to expand the scope of post-conviction proceedings in response to the Supreme Court's
expansion of the availability of habeas corpus). The basis of the Court's rejection of a
constitutional right to counsel post-trial lies in the language of the Sixth Amendment, which
guarantees counsel to an "accused" for his "defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In the Court's view,
after an adjudication of guilt, either by trial or plea, a defendant is no longer an "accused" person
presenting a defense. Rather, he is a convicted person attempting to overturn a presumptively

lawful determination of guilt. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610-11 (1974).
18. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752.

19. See id. at 753-54.
20. See id.
21. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 6.2 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2015).

22. 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1320 (2012).
23. See id. at 1317-18.
24. Justice Kennedy was quite explicit about this. Id. at 1317 (noting that effective
assistance of counsel at trial is a "bedrock principle in our justice system"). However, as the

dissent noted, there is no principled basis for limiting the exception to trial-level ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. See id. at 1321 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For example, claims that the
prosecution withheld exculpatory, material information (commonly referred to as Brady claims)

are also generally not available on direct appeal because the suppression of evidence has not yet
come to light. See, e.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 675, 693, 698 (2004) (granting a new
penalty phase to a death-sentenced inmate based on the suppression of information discovered for

the first time in federal habeas corpus proceedings). The same is also true in many cases involving
juror misconduct. See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 440 (2000) (finding that there was
"cause" in a state post-conviction proceeding for petitioner's failure to raise the claim that a juror

2016]
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exception only applies to jurisdictions that, either explicitly or as a matter
of practice, require claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel to be
asserted in state post-conviction proceedings. 25 In the Court's view, if a
defendant cannot challenge trial counsel's competency on direct
appeal-a proceeding in which she would have the right to the effective
assistance of appellate counsel-then the state collateral review process
constitutes the first opportunity for review. 2 6 Thus, this process is akin to
an appeal "as of right," in which the defendant is guaranteed the right to
the effective assistance of counsel.27
Returning to the bottom line, if state post-conviction counsel
unreasonably (and prejudicially) fails to raise a viable claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel, then there is "cause" (and likely
"prejudice")-and thus a gateway to a merits' review of the claim in
federal habeas corpus proceedings. So far, so good. But, in many
instances, state post-conviction counsel is also federal habeas corpus
counsel. In fact, in capital post-conviction cases, the pre-Martinez
preference and practice was for continuity of counsel from state to federal
court. 28 For obvious reasons, having state post-conviction counsel
represent the inmate in federal court was believed to promote higher
quality and more cost-effective representation. State post-conviction
counsel will also be familiar with the trial and post-conviction records
and the issues in the case (and thus will not need additional time to "get
up to speed"), but will also-in most instances-have a positive working
relationship with the client. And, given the paucity of funding for counsel
(and experts) in many states in state collateral proceedings, 2 9 state postlied on voir dire when evidence was not discovered until completion of direct appeal and state

collateral review).
25. See Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1918, 1921 (2013) (finding that Texas law, as a
matter of course, requires defendants to assert ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims in state
post-conviction proceedings because the "Texas procedural system . . . does not offer most
defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel
on direct appeal").
26. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315-16.

27. See id. at 1319. While the Court analogized post-conviction proceedings in this context
to an appeal of right, it did not hold that there is a constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction

proceedings; instead, the Court relied upon principles of equity to create the exception for
otherwise procedurally barred claims. Id. at 1319-20. Presumably, it did so in an attempt to
"cabin" the exception-limit it to ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, which would have
been impossible had the Court recognized a constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction
proceedings. See id Perhaps it also did so to limit the fiscal burden on the states that would follow
from creating a constitutional right to counsel.

28. See Guide to the Appointment and Compensation of Counsel Under the Criminal Justice
Act, section *.28. See 7A ADMIN.

OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY

§ 220.25(c) (2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/2793/download.
29. Benjamin H. Barton & Sephanos Bibas, TriagingAppointed-CounselFundingand Pro
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conviction counsel may have taken the case through the state collateral
appeals system hoping to recoup some of their investment in federal court
given the relatively better compensation system for counsel in federal
habeas corpus cases. 3 0
Yet this common and preferred practice developed in a legal regime
in which inadequate assistance of state post-conviction counsel was of no
significance. That is no longer true; it is now a means of having federal
courts adjudicate procedurally defaulted claims, and thus-in any given
case-could literally be the difference between a client rotting in prison
or being released and, in some instances, lives or dies. 3 1 Given this shift
in the relevance of the quality of state post-conviction representation,
what are the implications of Martinez's recognition of inadequate
assistance of post-conviction counsel as "cause" for a procedural default
for cases currently pending in (or about to enter) federal habeas corpus
proceedings where counsel who are appointed (or seek to be appointed)
represented the inmate in state post-conviction proceedings? The
question becomes more complicated when considered in light of a
defense attorney's obligations under both the Sixth Amendment's right
to effective assistance of counsel and the rules of professional conduct
generally applicable to all lawyers. 3 2 Although criminal defense lawyers
Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PENN. L. REV. 967, 972-73 (2012); see also Ira P. Robbins, Toward
a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1,

76-77 (1990) (noting that many states pay attorneys virtually nothing to defend in capital cases).
30. It is not always the case that state post-conviction counsel also represents the inmate in
federal habeas corpus proceedings. Sometimes, the client may want new counsel, or the lawyer
may conclude she is not competent to represent the client in federal court given the complexity of
federal habeas corpus. In other cases, the state collateral appeals lawyer may work for a state
defender organization that cannot appear in federal court, or the jurisdiction may have a unit in a

Federal Public Defender's Office (generally referred to as Capital Habeas Units) that is staffed
and funded to represent persons only in federal habeas proceedings. See, e.g., Capital Habeas
Unit, FED. PuB. DEFENDER: DISTRICT ARIZ.. http://www.fpdaz.org/#!capital-habeas-unit/bgm64

(last visited Feb. 10, 2016). But, prevailing national practice, especially in active death penalty
jurisdictions such as Alabama, Texas, South Carolina, and Virginia, is for continuity of
representation from state to federal court.
31. For example, the State of Virgina executed Roger Coleman after denying him federal
habeas review because his state post-conviction attorneys filed a notice of appeal three days late.
See Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, Innocence and the Death Penalty:
Assessing the Danger ofMistaken Executions, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Oct. 21, 1993), http://

www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-death-penalty-assessing-dangermistaken-executions.
32. All lawyers are subject to professional discipline, with sanctions ranging from a private
reprimand up to suspension from practice or disbarment, which courts of the state of the lawyer's
admission mete out. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 3.2, at 82, § 3.5, at
118 (student ed. 1986). The power to impose discipline is theoretically reposed in the state's
supreme court, although investigation and prosecution of disciplinary matters is generally
delegated to an agency of the court. See I GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF

LAWYERING

§ 1.16, 30-31 (3d ed. Supp. 2014). Discipline is based on evidence of a violation of
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and prosecutors quite understandably tend to think first in terms of
constitutional principles, they must also comply with the lawyer
disciplinary rules of the state of their admission. Under these rules, a state
post-conviction lawyer who failed-unreasonably and with prejudiceto raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim with respect to trialcourt representation likely has a material-limitation conflict of interest
under state versions of the concurrent conflicts rule. 33
Lawyers who practice in the area of civil litigation or transactional
representation are familiar with "prior work" conflicts and the solution to
them, which is to obtain the informed consent of the affected client after
full disclosure of the facts giving rise to the conflict and the available
alternatives. 34 As this Article discusses below, however, the standard
response within the law of professional responsibility-relying on the
informed consent doctrine-is ill adapted to the circumstances of
criminal defense, particularly capital defense representation. 35
Martinez further complicates the standard approach by significantly
increasing the stakes around the evaluation of an attorney's own
malpractice and potential conflicts of interest. In the ordinary case, an
attorney is constantly making judgment calls, and maybe some of them
are mistakes. Most of these mistakes, however, will not end up amounting
to much, and even if they do, they are unlikely to subject the attorney to
liability for malpractice. Only in the unusual event of a mistake that
creates a substantial likelihood of subjecting the attorney to civil liability
will there be a conflict of interest requiring the attorney to obtain the
client's informed consent. Significantly, the rules of professional conduct
allow attorneys to make this judgment call as well. Attorneys decide
when they have made a mistake sufficiently serious to constitute
malpractice, when potential malpractice constitutes a conflict of interest,
whether that conflict is waivable, and what disclosure is adequate as a
ground for the client's informed consent.3 6 Ironically, even though the
state rules of professional conduct. This Article uses the terms "rules of professional conduct" and
"disciplinary rules" interchangeably here (with the latter term invoking the familiar "subject to
discipline" standard used on the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam).
33. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015) ("[A] lawyer
shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A
concurrent conflict of interest exists if: .. . there is a significant risk that the representation of one

or more clients will be materially limited . .. by a personal interest of the lawyer.").
34. See id. r. 1.0(e) (defining "informed consent" as "the agreement by a person to a
proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and

explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed
course of conduct").
35. See infra Section II.C.
36. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7, cmt. 2 (giving the lawyer responsibility

for determining the existence of a conflict, whether it is waivable, and what disclosure is required
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tort doctrine of malpractice and the rules of professional conduct are both
intended to protect clients, the rules allow the possibly negligent lawyer
to decide whether client protection requires disclosure and consent, or
possibly withdrawal from representation. 37 Given the significance of
ineffective assistance of counsel in capital cases, however, this kind of
self-monitoring would be intolerable. Hence, the puzzle presented by
Martinez, which recognizes the inability of lawyers to self-monitor, but
fails to provide a mechanism for ensuring that the client's rights are
adequately protected.
The difficulty of the Martinez problem is illustrated by a recent case
decided by the Supreme Court, Christeson v. Roper.3 8 In Christeson,
counsel appointed to represent a death row inmate missed the filing
deadline for their client's federal habeas petition, leading to its dismissal
as untimely under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA).3 9 Although the Court did not rule on the issue, counsel's
inexplicable errors, including not only miscalculating the limitations
period but also failing to communicate with their client after being
appointed at a particularly time-critical period, were likely the types of
"serious ... attorney misconduct" that could equitably toll the statute of
limitations. 4 0 For the attorneys to argue for equitable tolling, however,
would be to admit their own incompetence, creating a conflict between
the attorneys' duty to provide competent and diligent representation and
their interest in preserving their professional reputations. 4 1 The conflict
created by their prior incompetence rendered the attorneys unable to
represent the petitioner in the ongoing litigation, involving as it would the
attempt to equitably toll the AEDPA statute of limitations. 42 But
Christeson only highlights the Martinez problem; it does not point toward
in order to satisfy the informed consent standard). We are grateful to Bruce Green for emphasizing
this aspect of the usual relationship between malpractice and conflicts of interest.
37. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 4.

38.
39.
40.
41.

135 S. Ct. 891 (2015).
Id. at 892.
Id. at 892, 894 (quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 651-52 (2010)).
Id at 894. The Court gives the attorneys some credit for recognizing this conflict, but

the attorneys actually missed the point completely. They noted that a hearing on whether they had
abandoned their client (and thus created grounds for equitable tolling) would involve them as
essential witnesses. Id. This would involve a violation of the advocate-witness rule. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.7(a). The advocate-witness rule, which is really aimed at
preventing jury confusion and is in any event waivable if disqualification would work substantial
hardship on the client, id. r. 3.7(a)(3) cmt. 2, was the least of the attorneys' problems. A substantial
likelihood that the attorneys would make arguments that "manifestly served their own
professional and reputational interests," to the direct detriment to their client's interests, is a

serious and non-waivable conflict under Rule 1.7(a)(1) of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. Christeson, 135 S. Ct. at 895.
42. Christeson, 135 S. Ct. at 895.
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a solution. The attorneys' conflict of interest came to the attention of the
district court through the efforts of independent lawyers who had
examined the case and immediately spotted the conflict. 4 3 If this second
pair of lawyers had not injected themselves into the case (as there is
currently no mechanism to ensure the involvement of conflict-free
substitute counsel), the petitioner would have lost the opportunity to
argue for equitable tolling and file a federal habeas petition.
This Article's analysis begins in Part I by attempting to disentangle
the relationship between the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the
effective assistance of counsel and the rules of professional conduct
adopted by state courts for the regulation of lawyers in that state. Courts,
including the Supreme Court, sometimes talk as though a lawyer's
obligations under the rules of professional conduct are some kind of
lower-order law that is less important than the Sixth Amendment. While
of course the Constitution is the supreme law of the land and state courts
may not impose duties on counsel that contravene it, lawyers quite
understandably are concerned with complying with all the standards that
govern their professional conduct. As a criminal procedure and a
professional responsibility scholar, respectively, we speak somewhat
different languages when talking about the duties of a criminal defense
attorney-but this Article indicates that these perspectives must be
integrated when considering the Martinez dilemma. Accordingly, Part II
takes a step back from the specific context of state and federal postconviction representation and looks at prior-work conflicts of interest
more generally, as they would be handled under the state rules of
professional conduct. In an ideal case, as noted above, it would be
possible for a lawyer to handle this problem by providing full disclosure
to the client and obtaining the client's informed consent to continued
representation. 4 4 As is so often the case, however, "death is different," 45
and there are features of capital defense representation that make the
problem of prior-work conflicts much more difficult to deal with. The
insidious nature of entrusting an attorney to self-monitor conflicts of
interest, even when there are reasons to question the attorney's capacity
for exercising independent judgment, may be tolerable in ordinary civil
malpractice cases and is certainly tolerable in those frequently litigated
cases involving sophisticated, repeat-player clients. But in the
representation of individual, disempowered clients-often suffering from
mental illness or cognitive disabilities-there must be an alternative to
the usual approach. Finally, Part III considers the contextual features that
make conflicts of interest particularly difficult in federal habeas

43. See id. at 892-93.
44. See supra text accompanying note 37.

45. See, e.g., Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 185 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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representation and suggests some approaches to resolving Martinez
conflicts in the inherently non-ideal world of capital litigation.

I.

THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY

The norms governing criminal defense lawyering, including postconviction representation, are an amalgam of several different bodies of
law that stand in an uneasy relationship to one another. However, they all
create duties on the part of lawyers, despite the tendency of some lawyers
to ignore them. In particular, criminal defense lawyers accustomed to
thinking in terms of the Sixth Amendment's right to the effective
assistance of counsel may sometimes overlook the disciplinary rules
governing conflicts of interest. Civil litigators and transactional lawyers
live and die by the conflicts rules because they can make the difference
between the ability to accept a long-lasting, lucrative representation of a
client and the obligation to decline such representation. Litigating
motions to disqualify is an expensive headache even if the motion is
ultimately unsuccessful, so lawyers spend a great deal of energy on
prevention strategies designed to head off the possibility of
disqualification. Criminal defense lawyers, by contrast, tend to analyze
conflicts exclusively in terms of the Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel, which has the relatively unusual remedy of a new
trial, as seen in Sixth Amendment cases such as Cuyler v. Sullivan46 and
Mickens v. Taylor.47 While all lawyers are in principle subject to state
rules of professional conduct, many criminal defense lawyers overlook
these professional responsibilities and focus only on the Sixth
Amendment standards.
While there is plenty of ignorance of the law governing lawyers to go
around, among both civil and criminal litigators, many civil lawyers at
least practice in large law firms with in-house counsel to advise them on
the technical aspects of conflicts of interest. 4 8 These firms are also
generally very sensitive to the possibility of civil liability for malpractice
or breach of fiduciary duty, and they are often subject to malpractice
insurance guidelines that limit potential liability exposure. Criminal
defense lawyers, by contrast, may work in large public defender
46. 446 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1980). Sullivan, in turn, was based on earlier cases such as
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484 (1978), and Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76
(1942). See Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 349-50. Sullivan, Holloway, and Glasserdiffer from the nowstandard Sixth Amendment framework subsequently established in Stricklandv. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 697 (1984), in that Strickland requires an additional showing of prejudice.
47. 535 U.S. 162, 164 (2002).
48. Elizabeth Chambliss, The Scope of In-Firm Privilege, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1721,
1721 (2005).
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organizations but are frequently solo or small-firm practitioners and
therefore do not have the same kind of compliance infrastructure. 4 9
However, they do consider potential claims for ineffective assistance of
counsel, which becomes the primary framework for understanding
conflicts of interest in criminal defense representation. Courts also
sometimes overlook the duties imposed by the rules of professional
conduct, perhaps unaware that a defense lawyer who raises a conflict of
interest is not playing games or stalling for time but trying in good faith
to comply with her obligations under the disciplinary rules. This Part
analyzes the Martinez dilemma by considering the relationship between
the federal and state systems of regulating the professional conduct of
lawyers.
It is admirable for defense lawyers to aim at representation that
satisfies the minimum guarantees of the Constitution, but it is a serious
mistake, analytically and as a matter of ethical lawyering, to fail to
consider duties that go beyond the constitutional floor established by the
ineffective assistance of counsel cases. Concerns over the remedy that
follows from a finding of ineffective assistance pervade many Sixth.
Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel cases; if there is a finding
of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court must hold a new trial, this
time with representation free from constitutional error.50 Courts are.
reluctant to set too high a threshold for the minimum standard of
representation, fearing a flood of new trials would follow. Lawyers may
therefore infer erroneously that they are obligated to do no more than
avoid a conflict that would lead to a new trial. As the Supreme Court has
reason
for
not,
however,
another
emphasized
repeatedly,
constitutionalizing the law of professional responsibility is that the legal
profession is an independent, self-governing institution.5 1 If defense
lawyers are thankful that federal courts applying the Sixth Amendment
are not micromanaging their conduct in representing clients, they must
understand the basis for that deference, which is the courts' expectation
that lawyers will comply with norms established by the profession itself.

49. This is true even if the defense lawyer is a public defender in a large office. Due to large
caseloads and systemic under-funding of the indigent defense, even large defender organizations
do not have anything approaching the conflict-compliance procedures used in the civil litigation
context. See, e.g., Barton & Bibas, supra note 29, at 972-77.
50. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 6(12) (AM. LAW INST.
2000) (listing "granting a new trial" as a potential remedy for a lawyer's breach of a duty to a

client).
51. See, e.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165 (1986) (holding that constitutionalizing
the Rules of Professional Conduct would be "intrud[ing] into the state's proper authority to define

and apply the standards of professional conduct applicable to those it admits to practice in its
courts").
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As discussed below, 52 those norms are embodied in state rules of
professional conduct, based in every jurisdiction (except California) on
the American Bar Association's (ABA) Model Rules. 53 They apply to all
lawyers, regardless of the context in which they practice, and not only
provide the grounds for potential professional discipline (disbarment,
suspension, reprimand, etc.), but also state the profession's own vision of
what constitutes ethical conduct.5 4
Courts, in turn, need to be aware of the mess they make when they fail
to consider the interaction among seemingly separate, but in fact related,
sources of professional guidance. For example, the Court in Mickens
created considerable uncertainty over the application of the presumption
of prejudice in Cuyler to conflicts of interest other than concurrentrepresentation conflicts. Writing for the Court, Justice Antonin Scalia
observed:
The purpose of our Holloway and [Cuyler] exceptions from
the ordinary requirements of Strickland, however, is not to
enforce the Canons of Legal Ethics, but to apply needed
prophylaxis in situations where Strickland itself is evidently
inadequate to assure vindication of the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. In resolving this case on the
grounds on which it was presented to us, we do not rule upon
the need for the Sullivan prophylaxis in cases of successive
representation.

Never mind that the "Canons of Legal Ethics" have not been in effect
in any jurisdiction since the adoption of disciplinary rules based on the
ABA's Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code) in the
early 1970s. 5 6 Justice Scalia blurred the distinction between the
52. See infra p. 17 and note 84.
53. See infra note 84.
54. Because the Model Rules are intended to apply to all lawyers, further specification of

duties may be required in specialized areas of practice. Under the auspices of the ABA,
committees of experienced lawyers, judges, and law professors produce commentary or guidelines
that show how the general duties stated in the Model Rules apply in particular contexts. See, e.g.,
Lawrence J. Fox, CapitalGuidelines and Ethical Duties: Mutually Reinforcing Responsibilities,

36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 775, 776 (2008) (explaining how the ABA's capital defense counsel
guidelines are derived from duties stated in the Model Rules).

55. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 176 (4th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
56. See HAZARD, supra note 32, § 1.11, at 1-21. The ABA promulgated the Canons of Ethics
in 1908. Id § 1.10, at 1-20. They had only precatory effect, except to the extent they overlapped
with the common law governing lawyers. Id. § 1.10, at 1-20 to -21. "[Tlhey were not adopted or
re-promulgated by the courts as law." Id. The most charitable interpretation of Justice Scalia's

dismissal of the rules of professional conduct, supported by his reference to the Canons, is that he
was thinking of this long-outdated list of aspirations. It is perfectly clear today, however, that the
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successive-representation conflicts rule, which itselfis a prophylactic rule
designed to protect the client's reasonable expectation of the former
lawyer's loyalty and confidentiality,5 7 and the prophylactic application of
the presumption of prejudice. It may be that there was no Sixth
Amendment violation because the conflict of interest had no effect on the
representation.5 8 That does not mean, however, that Mickens' lawyer did
not have a conflict of interest. He had previously represented the victim
in an unrelated criminal matter 5 9 and, as a result, almost certainly learned
confidential information that he was professionally obligated to keep
secret. He also may have felt a residual sense of loyalty to his former
client, which might have made it more difficult to pursue certain avenues
in defense of his present client. The effect on the representation may not
have risen to the level of an "actual conflict of interest [that] adversely
affected [the] lawyer's performance," as required to trigger the
presumption of prejudice under Cuyler6 0 (although there are strong
arguments that it did), but it may nevertheless have been a sufficiently
serious interference with the lawyer's duties to require him to withdraw
from the representation and permit the defendant to secure substitute
counsel.
All lawyers are subject to discipline for violations of the rules of
conduct adopted in the state or states in which they are admitted to
practice.61 State courts enact these rules pursuant to the inherent power
of the state judiciary to regulate the practice of law in the territorial
jurisdiction of the state. 62 They not only represent the views of the
Model Rules are "set forth in the manner of a true code-mandatory conduct rules, without the
'softening' addition of hortatory provisions that were meant to inspire rather than coerce." Id.
§ 1.12, at 1-21.
57. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.9 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2015).
58. See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 179 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Specifically, Mickens involved
a defense attorney assigned to represent a minor on assault and concealed-weapon charges. Id. at
164 (majority opinion). The appointed attorney met with the client one time for between fifteen
and thirty minutes. Id. Within the week, the minor client was murdered. Id. at 164-65. The minor
defendant's initial lawyer was subsequently appointed as defense counsel for the man accused of

the forcible sodomy and murder of his former client. Id.
59. See id. at 164.

60. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980).
61. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.5(a).
62. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 1 cmt. b (AM. LAW
INST. 2000). The Restatement is a significant source of authority in the law of professional
responsibility because it attempts to unify the principles expressed in the state rules of professional
conduct with generally applicable norms of tort, contract, agency, procedure, and other law that
bear on the conduct of lawyers. For example, provisions respecting conflicts of interest take into
account not only cases imposing discipline for representing a client while subject to a conflict,
but also cases involving disqualification by a court from the representation of a client due to
conflicts of interest, which is technically an aspect of a different inherent power of a tribunal-
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organized profession concerning the ethical obligations of lawyers, but
also are enforceable through state disciplinary procedures. 63 As the
Supreme Court explained in Strickland,6 4 defense lawyers are also
obligated by their clients' Sixth Amendment rights to provide effective
assistance of counsel.6 5 A lawyer owes the client a duty of objectively
reasonable performance, as measured by prevailing professional norms. 6 6
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the Court in Strickland,
suggested that rules of professional conduct adopted by state courts are
one source of guidance for determining the content of these norms. 6 7 At
the same time, however, she cautioned against a per se equivalence
between the constitutionally guaranteed effective assistance of counsel
and conduct that was mandatory under state disciplinary rules:
No particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can
satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances
faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions
regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant. Any
such set of rules would interfere with the constitutionally
protected independence of counsel and restrict the wide
latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions. 6 8
The ideal of the bar as an independent institution, to which Justice
O'Connor appeals, has deep historical roots, 69 and it is understandable
that at the time she authored Strickland she did not wish to involve the
Court in establishing detailed guidelines for competent representation.
However, the language in numerous ineffective assistance of counsel
the power to regulate the conduct of litigation in that court. See id. § I cmt. c; WOLFRAM, supra
note 32, § 2.2.4, at 31-32 (distinguishing a trial court's inherent authority to regulate the conduct
of lawyers appearing before the tribunal from the inherent power of the judiciary more broadly to
regulate the legal profession). Disqualification is an equitable remedy imposed by courts to protect

the integrity of its proceedings. Because it is an equitable remedy, however, and because not all
participants in a litigated matter may have standing to raise a conflict of interest in a motion to
disqualify, disqualification cases may diverge in important ways from cases imposing
professional discipline or, for that matter, from cases involving lawsuits by clients for malpractice
or breach of fiduciary duty arising out of a conflict-burdened representation. The Restatement
does an admirable job of unifying these diverse sources of normative authority into a relatively

coherent body of law-the law governing lawyers.
63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

§

5(1).

466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
Id.
Id. at 688.
Id.
Id. at 688-89.

69. See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1988)
(chronicling the historical meaning of professional independence and how lawyers have "pursued
their vision of independence in their practices").
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cases decided since Strickland has created unnecessary confusion with
respect to the relationship between the rules of professional conduct and
the constitutional minimum for competent performance by defense
counsel. In particular, some Justices seem to have contributed to an
attitude among judges and lawyers that the state rules of professional
conduct are inferior to other sources of guidance for lawyers. At the very
least, the Court has not been consistent in the attitude it expresses toward
state disciplinary rules, which may have had the unfortunate result of
tacitly suggesting to defense lawyers that the rules are unimportant.
Consider Nix v. Whiteside.7 0 In that case, after the defendant suddenly
changed his account of how a killing took place, the defense lawyer told
his client that if the client insisted on taking the stand and testifying
falsely, it would be counsel's duty to inform the court that he felt his
client was committing perjury and to seek to withdraw. 7 1 The client
subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that his
lawyer's refusal to allow him to testify to the second version of events
deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel.7 2 Applying the
performance prong of Strickland, the Court reiterated that prevailing
professional norms are the yardstick for measuring competent
representation. 73 Significantly, it distinguished between what state rules
of professional conduct might require, on the one hand, and what the
Sixth Amendment might require on the other:
Under the Strickland standard, breach of an ethical standard
does not necessarily make out a denial of the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel. When
examining attorney conduct, a court must be careful not to
narrow the wide range of conduct acceptable under the Sixth
Amendment so restrictively as to constitutionalize particular
standards of professional conduct and thereby intrude into
the state's proper authority to define and apply the standards
of professional conduct applicable to those it admits to
practice in its courts.74
70.
71.
72.
73.

475 U.S. 157 (1986).
Id. at 161.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 165.

74. Id. The Court's use of the term "ethical standard" here, while familiar enough, is
potentially misleading because state rules of professional conduct are legally enforceable rules of
positive law, not merely statements of what a good lawyer ought to do. See LIAM MURPHY, WHAT
MAKES LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 23-24 (2014) (defining positive law
as that which can be ascertained without moral deliberation about what the law ought to be). There
are many different ways to understand the word "ethics." The ABA Model Code distinguished
between statements of best practices that were not intended to constitute enforceable rules, called
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The Court then set out a summary of the duties of counsel, as a matter
of the state rules of professional conduct, for when a criminal defendant
announces the intention to testify falsely. 7 5 Here is where the Justices'
discussion of the applicable standards of professional conduct subtly
diverge, showing the importance of the Court's attitude toward the
disciplinary rules.
Chief Justice Warren Burger, writing for the majority, stated that "an
attorney's revelation of his client's perjury to the court is a professionally
responsible and acceptable response to the conduct of a client who has
actually given perjured testimony." 7 6 That would be true today. The
Model Rules arguably permit the lawyer's conduct in Whiteside-sternly
admonishing the client to tell the truth and informing him of counsel's
duties to inform the court and withdraw from representation in the event
of perjury.7 7 The defense lawyer's conduct would therefore be within
Ethical Considerations (ECs), and enforceable, black-letter rules, called Disciplinary Rules (DRs),
stating minimum standards of conduct, the violation of which would subject an attorney to
discipline. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY PRELIMINARY STATEMENT (AM. BAR

Ass'N 1980). This distinction corresponds with what Professor Lon Fuller called the "morality of
aspiration" and the "morality of duty," respectively. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW

5-6 (1964). As Professor David Luban points out, this is an idiosyncratic use of the idea of
morality. See DAVID LUBAN, Natural Law as ProfessionalEthics: A Reading ofFuller, in LEGAL
ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 99, 105 (2007). Philosophers generally use "ethics" and "morality"

interchangeably, although a few philosophers have attempted to argue for a distinction. See, e.g.,
BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 6 (1985). The important distinction
for the purposes of the ethics and conduct of lawyers is between (1) norms that take the form of

enforceable standards, potentially subjecting lawyers to some form of legal sanctions, including
professional discipline (disbarment, suspension, reprimand, etc.), civil liability, or a finding of
constitutional ineffectiveness, and (2) norms that make rational demands on any moral agent,
including those acting in a professional capacity, and thus establish standards for the evaluation
of conduct as right or wrong irrespective of law. For example, one might contend that it is wrong
in ethical terms to dedicate one's skill and training as a lawyer to prevent the extradition to Israel
of an accused concentration camp guard, while conceding that there is no legal prohibition on
doing so. See Monroe H. Freedman, Must You Be the Devil's Advocate?, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 23,
1993, at 19, reprinted in MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS'

ETHICS app. A, at 371 (4th ed. 2010). While the term "legal ethics" is often understood as
equivalent to the law governing lawyers or the state rules of professional conduct, to preserve
analytical clarity, this Article does not use it in this way.
75. Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 166-68.
76. Id. at 170.
77. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015) ("Ifa lawyer
knows that the client intends to testify falsely . . . the lawyer should seek to persuade the client
[and] . . . [ilf the persuasion is ineffective .. . the lawyer must refuse to offer the false evidence.").

The lawyer may have misapplied the rules, however, by concluding that the client intended to
testify falsely, based on the client changing his story and saying that, based on other cases that
argued self defense, "IfI don't say I saw a gun, I'm dead." Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 161. The duties
imposed on lawyers with respect to false testimony are triggered only when the lawyer knows the
testimony will be false. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. 6. Knowledge is a defined
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prevailing norms of professional conduct under the Model Rules, which
are now the basis for the rules of professional conduct in forty-nine states
and the District of Columbia.7 1 Complicating the analysis, however,
Chief Justice Burger apparently misunderstood the Model Code, a
version of which was then in effect in Iowa. 7 9 The Model Code handled
the problem of perjury in an awkward, roundabout way. In contrast with
the Model Rules, which have a specific rule for witness perjury and an
explicit priority of duties between candor to the tribunal and maintaining
client confidences,8 0 the Model Code treated the professional response to
client perjury as an instance of the general problem of assisting client
crimes and of disclosing confidential information to prevent future
crimes. 81 Because it handled the problem in this way, it created ambiguity
term in the Model Rules and refers to actual (subjective) knowledge. Id. r. 1.0(f). Court decisions
occasionally underscore that knowledge really does mean knowledge. See, e.g., State v.

McDowell, 681 N.W.2d 500, 518-19 (Wis. 2004) (defining knowledge of intended perjury as
knowledge "based on the client's expressed admission ofintent to testify untruthfully") (emphasis

added).
78. See CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/publications/model rulesof pr

ofessionalconduct.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2016). California remains a holdout, with a hybrid
system based on its own rules of professional conduct and various provisions of the California
Business & Professions Code. See CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1-100(A) (STATE
BAR OF CAL. 2014).
79. See Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 167-68. Additionally, lawyers sometimes misunderstand the

lack of authority of the ABA Model Code and Model Rules. The word "model" is not used for
nothing. Committees of the ABA, consisting of lawyers, judges, and academics, propose rules of

professional conduct that states can be adopt, but the ABA models have no force until the highest
court of a state adopts them. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§

I

cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2000). Professional responsibility scholars may speak informally of duties
under the Model Rules, but it is well established that the binding rules are those adopted by the
state's highest court. See id This is not merely a pedantic distinction, as state courts may vary the
content of the rules from the ABA versions. As a general rule, the more controversial an issue is
in the law of lawyering, the more state-by-state variation can be expected.
80. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.3(c) (stating that the duties in Rule 3.3 apply
even where compliance would require disclosure of information protected by the duty of
confidentiality in Rule 1.6). The rule requires the lawyer to refuse to offer evidence known to be
false and to take "reasonable remedial measures" if the lawyer later comes to learn of the falsity
of evidence previously offered. Id. r. 3.3(a)(3). Those remedial measures include first trying to
persuade the witness not to testify falsely or to correct previously given false testimony but may
ultimately include disclosure to the tribunal of the perjury. Id. r. 3.3 cmt. [10].
81. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(4) (AM. BAR Ass'N 1980)
[k]nowingly use perjured testimony"). As compared with the Model
("[A] lawyer shall not ...
Rules, this provision is troublesome because it does not provide guidance to a lawyer confronted
with a client, such as Emanuel Whiteside, who is apparently determined to testify falsely. The
attorney's duty of confidentiality would cover the communication from the client to the lawyer in
which the client expresses an intention to lie on the stand. In Whiteside, the client stated that he
believed that if he did not testify to having seen a gun, he would not be successful in claiming

self-defense. 475 U.S. at 161. What should the lawyer do in that case? The Model Code did allow
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concerning the permissibility of revealing false testimony after the fact,
as permitted by the Model Rules. 8 2 Chief Justice Burger seemed
unimpressed with this technical distinction-which of course would be
highly significant to a lawyer seeking to avoid professional disciplineand relied instead on the proposition that a lawyer's permissible actions
are limited to "legitimate, lawful conduct compatible with the very nature
of a trial as a search for truth." 83
Justice William Brennan wrote separately to emphasize that the
decision established only the proposition that if a lawyer complies with
the state rules of professional conduct regarding client perjury, then the
lawyer's representation could not be constitutionally ineffective. 84 The
case does not stand for the rule that a lawyer is constitutionally required
to dissuade a client from committing perjury, disclose it to the court, or
take any other specific steps if he knows a client intends to testify
falsely.8 5 Justice Brennan reminded lawyers that "the Court's essay
regarding what constitutes the correct response to a criminal client's
suggestion that he will perjure himself is pure discourse without force of
law." 86

a lawyer to disclose "[t]he intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary
to prevent the crime." MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3). Because perjury

is a crime, Whiteside's lawyer would have been permitted to disclose the client's stated intention
to testify falsely. The lawyer would also have been permitted, and perhaps required, to withdraw
if the continued representation would result in a violation of a disciplinary rule or would constitute
an illegal course of conduct; perjury, a crime, would satisfy those requirements. See id DR 2-

1 10(B)(2), (C)(1)(b), (C)(2).
82. On its face the Model Code seemed to require, not merely to permit, after-the-fact
revelation of client perjury. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) ("A

lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that .

.

. [h]is client has, in the course of

representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to
rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the

affected person or tribunal, except when the information is protected as a privileged
communication."). Note the last clause - "except when . . . protected as a privileged
communication." Lawyer knowledge of client perjury is likely to come from a confidential
attorney-client communication and thus be within the protection of the attorney-client privilege.
But the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics, in Formal Opinion 341 (1975), stated that the
"except" clause should be read more broadly, as emcompassing both "secrets" (that is,

information protected by the duty of confidentiality) as well as attorney-client privileged
communications. What DR 7-102(B)(1) seemed to create as a retrospective duty to disclose client
perjury was thus completely undercut by the "except" clause and its interpretation by the ABA
Committee. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 133-

44 (2d ed. 2002) (recounting this history).
83. Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 166.
84. See id. at 177 (Brennan, J., concurring).

85. See id.
86. Id.
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It is important to see that Whiteside does not stand for the principle
that there is no relationship between the state rules of professional
conduct and the Sixth Amendment. It is true that not all violations of the
rules of professional conduct give rise to a claim for ineffective assistance
of counsel, just as not all conduct in violation of the rules gives rise to a
malpractice claim. It could be the case, however, consistent with
Whiteside, that a violation of the state disciplinary rules also violates the
performance prong of Strickland. That is an open question after
Strickland and Whiteside. What is remarkable about Whiteside,
considered in the context of subsequent Supreme Court cases, is how
seriously some of the Justices took the state rules of professional conduct.
Justice Burger's majority opinion traced the history of the rule on client
perjury from the 1908 Canons of Ethics, through the 1969 Model Code,
to the 1983 Model Rules, noting that the disciplinary rules had always
imposed some duty on counsel to avoid introducing perjured testimony
or other false evidence. 87 The majority analyzed a lawyer's duty under
the Model Rules and Model Code and stated without hedging that "under
no circumstance may a lawyer either advocate or passively tolerate a
client's giving false testimony."88 The Court seems to have been saying
that the disciplinary rules-the then-existing Iowa Code of Professional
Responsibility-are consistent with the defense lawyer's duties under the
Sixth Amendment, and therefore there can be no constitutional
ineffectiveness in a representation in which the lawyer follows rules that
apparently coincide with a plausible constitutional vision of the defense
lawyer's role. 89
Justice Harry Blackmun was, if anything, more deferential to state
rules of professional conduct. 90 He saw the problem of the proper
professional response to client perjury as a difficult one, calling for the
exercise of judgment and consideration of a number of factors that are
likely to differ case-by-case. 9 1 A "blanket rule" adopted by the Court
would unnecessarily limit the flexibility states have to adopt rules that
reflect differing approaches to the perjury problem. 92 For that reason,
Justice Blackmun thought the primary source of norms governing the
conduct of criminal defense lawyers ought to be the state disciplinary
rules. 93 Federalism concerns substantially drove Justice Blackmun's
opinion, leading him to conclude that the Sixth Amendment is, in a sense,
87. Id. at 166-68 (majority opinion).
88. Id at 171.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See id at 175.
See id. at 189-90 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Id. at 188-89.
Id. at 189.
See id at 189-90.
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subordinated to the inherent authority of state courts to regulate the legal
profession. 9 4
In subsequent cases, however, some Justices have sought to drive a
wedge between the Sixth Amendment and other norms of professional
conduct, implicitly subordinating the latter. For example, in Holland v.
Florida,95 a lawyer was appointed to represent a death row inmate in
filing a federal habeas corpus petition. 96 The lawyer failed to file the
petition within the one-year statute of limitations prescribed by the
AEDPA. 97 The Court held that the statute was equitably tolled due to the
extraordinary circumstance of the lawyer's failure to satisfy applicable
professional standards of care. 9 8 As a matter of state law, the lawyer's
misconduct went far beyond "garden variety" negligence and constituted
a violation of fundamental standards of professional responsibility.9 9
Ironically, Justice Scalia, who was ordinarily inclined to give states room
to regulate without excessive intrusion by federal courts,' 00 dissented in
Holland, arguing that the majority had failed to identify a standard under
which the lawyer's performance was grossly negligent.' 0 ' Justice Scalia
stated, "The only thing the Court offers that approaches substantive
instruction is its implicit approval of 'fundamental canons of professional
responsibility,' articulated by an ad hoc group of legal-ethicist amici
consisting mainly of professors of that least analytically rigorous and
hence most subjective of law-school subjects, legal ethics." 02
The sources relied upon by the Court majority-the Model Rules and
the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, which were in
effect in Florida and applicable to the lawyer's representation of the
petitioner 103 -self-evidently do not state subjective standards. A
subjective standard would approve of a lawyer's conduct as long as he
94. See id.
95. 560 U.S. 631 (2010).
96. Id. at 635-66.
97. Id. at 635, 643 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(l)-(2) (2012)).
98. Id. at 649.
99. Id. at 652-53 (citing Brief of Legal Ethics Professors et al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioner, Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) (No. 09-5327), 2009 WL 5177143). One
of the authors of this Article was a signatory on the amicus brief.

100. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,429 (2003) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (stating that the Due Process Clause does not provide substantive protection against
excessive punitive damages awards); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 576-78 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (urging deference to state policy in favor of single-sex education at Virginia
Military Institute); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 598-99 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the Due Process Clause is not a "secret repository of substantive
guarantees against 'unfairness'").

101. Holland, 560 U.S. at 670 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102. Id.
103. Id at 652-53 (majority opinion).
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"acted honestly and bona fide to the best of his own judgment." 04 An
objective standard, on the other hand, requires lawyers to measure up to
the standards set by others within the profession. These standards are
objective to the extent there is something other than the lawyer's own
best efforts that can be used to determine whether the lawyer's
performance was adequate. 0 5 Indeed, the brief brushed aside by Justice
Scalia discussed objective duties of competence, communication, and
loyalty grounded in tort, agency, and constitutional law, as well as the
rules of professional conduct.1 06
Justice Scalia knew the difference between objective and subjective
standards, and he was perfectly well acquainted with the use of custom
to establish standards of care in other contexts, so his dismissal reflected
either a substantive disagreement with the content of the standards
established by the rules or an annoyance that state courts have adopted
standards of professional conduct that require lawyers to take their
fiduciary duties to clients seriously. But the opinion also reflects a reverse
of the subordination described by Justice Blackmun in Whiteside. Rather
than federal courts deferring to state disciplinary rules to preserve
flexibility and a variety of responses to a problem of professional ethics;
Justice Scalia wished to oust the authority of state courts and disciplinary
rules and to replace them with a blanket federal constitutional rule that
licensed gross negligence by defense counsel. The trouble with this
reverse-subordination move is that it is inconsistent with the principle in
Strickland that the legal profession's prevailing norms set the standard
for effective assistance of counsel. Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Strickland cautioned courts not to create rigid guidelines for defense
lawyers and also warned against judging in hindsight, but it did so while
emphasizing that courts should look to the profession to flesh out the
required standard of care:

104. Cf Vaughan v. Menlove (1837), 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493; 3 Bing. (N.C.) 468, 474-75
(rejecting this approach to duties of reasonable care in tort law).
105. Every first-year torts student is familiar with the distinction drawn by then-Judge Oliver
Wendell Holmes between a person doing the best he is able and the standard of conduct that the
law requires:
If. . . a man is born hasty and awkward, is always having accidents and hurting

himself or his neighbors, no doubt his congenital defects will be allowed for in
the courts of Heaven, but his slips are no less troublesome to his neighbors than

if they sprang from guilty neglect. His neighbors accordingly require him, at his
proper peril, to come up to their standard ....
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 108 (1881).

106. See Brief of Legal Ethics Professors et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 99.
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Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar
Association standards and the like are guides to determining
what is reasonable, but they are only guides. No particular
set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily
take account of the variety of circumstances faced by
defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions
regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant. Any
such set of rules would interfere with the constitutionally
protected independence of counsel and restrict the wide
latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions.
Indeed, the existence of detailed guidelines for
representation could distract counsel from the overriding
mission of vigorous advocacy of the defendant's cause. 10 7
It is clear that the Strickland analysis is intended to protect the
independence of the legal profession to define its own standards of
conduct, not to deny the practical authority of rules of professional
conduct for lawyers. 08
Other Justices devalue the rules of professional conduct through
benign neglect. In Maples v. Thomas,'0 9 for example, two pro bono
lawyers at Sullivan & Cromwell simply stopped working on their client's
state post-conviction review case, leading to a procedural default on the
ineffective assistance of counsel claim he subsequently brought in a
federal habeas corpus petition.' 1 0 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted that
by not seeking the permission of the trial court to withdraw as counsel of
record, the lawyers violated an Alabama rule of criminal procedure."'
Their conduct also violated the state disciplinary rules, which allow
withdrawal of an attorney only if the withdrawal "can be accomplished
without material adverse effect on the interests of the client" or if the
attorney otherwise has good cause, and if the attorney obtains the court's
permission." 2 This is not merely a technical quibble, but rather a
distinction that could make a difference in the evaluation of the attorneys'
conduct. The lawyers were first required to satisfy themselves that one of
seven alternative grounds for permissive withdrawal existed.1 3 As it
happens, there was no basis for permissive withdrawal-the attorneys
107. Id. at 688-89 (citations omitted).
108. See id. at 688 ("These basic duties neither exhaustively define the obligations of counsel
nor form a checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney performance.").

109. 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012).
110. Id. at 916-18.
111. Id. at 919.
112. See ALA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.16 (2015) ("When a lawyer has been
appointed to represent a client, withdrawal ordinarily requires approval of the appointing
authority.").
113. See ALA. RULES r. 1.16(b).

2016]

CAPITAL POST-CONVICTION REPRESENTATION

789

simply disregarded their obligation under the disciplinary rule. It may be
that this violation did not rise to the level of constitutionally ineffective
representation under the first prong of Strickland,1 14 but an obvious point
sometimes gets overlooked: the petitioner would not have defaulted on
his federal habeas petition if his attorneys at Sullivan & Cromwell had
complied with their obligation under the state rules of professional
conduct.
In other cases, the Court has stressed that it relies on defense lawyers
to comply with their obligations under the disciplinary rules. For
example, with regard to conflicts of interest,
Defense counsel have an ethical obligation to avoid
conflicting representations and to advise the court promptly
when a conflict of interest arises during the course of trial.
Absent special circumstances, therefore, trial courts may
assume either that multiple representation entails no conflict
or that the lawyer and his clients knowingly accept such risk
of conflict as may exist."
As the Court rightly noted, lawyers are in a better position to detect
and handle conflicts of interest, either by obtaining the informed consent
of their clients or by informing the court and seeking release from the
representation.11 6 If courts are going to rely on lawyers' compliance with
the rules, for understandable reasons such as minimizing information
costs, then they should be careful not to send mixed messages about their
importance.
Regardless of whether the Court's treatment of the state rules of
professional conduct reflects neglect or outright hostility, it is worrisome
that criminal defense lawyers may hear the message that the rules are
lower-status law and can be ignored whenever compliance is
inconvenient. One may certainly criticize the content of some rules for
being self-serving or insufficiently rigorous. Critics of the ABA have
long contended that the rules do more to protect the legal profession's

114. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) ("First, the defendant must
show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors
so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment.").

115. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346-47 (1980) (footnote omitted).
116. Id. at 346-47 ("An 'attorney representing two defendants in a criminal matter is in the
best position professionally and ethically to determine when a conflict of interest exists or will
probably develop in the course of a trial."' (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Holloway

v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 485 (1978))).
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monopoly than to safeguard the public interest,1 1 7 and that other
institutions, such as legislatures and administrative agencies, may be
better situated to address certain types of professional misconduct than
the profession itself.' 1 8 For the most part, however, the rules represent a
coherent, normatively attractive vision of ethical lawyering. The rules
emphasize the highly fiduciary nature of the lawyer-client relationship,
state strict duties of loyalty, and require a reasonable degree of
competence, diligence, and communication with clients." 9 Certainly if
the legal profession values its independence from intrusive oversight by
courts, legislatures, and regulatory agencies, lawyers have a reason to
follow the rules that they, as an organized profession, have adopted as a
quid pro quo for a monopoly over the provision of legal services. It is
understandable that courts do not want to create rigid, inflexible norms
of professional conduct under the guise of interpreting the Sixth
Amendment's right to effective assistance of counsel. But the duties
stated in the rules do not disappear merely because there may be no
federal habeas corpus remedy as a result of their violation. As the rules
themselves remind courts, the law generally does, and should, presuppose
voluntary compliance. 12 0
Voluntary compliance is even more important when the profession
claims the prerogative of self-regulation. Of course, the legal profession
is not really self-regulating: American lawyers are subject to various
court-administered sanctions for violations of professional standards,

117. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA PromulgateEthical Rules?, 59 TEX. L.
REV. 639, 655, 658 (1981); Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective
on Professional Codes, 59 TEx. L. REv. 689, 697-98, 704 (1981).
118. For example, Professor Susan Koniak understands the history of lawyers' involvement
in numerous financial scandals to reveal the ABA's inability to promulgate effective rules for the
protection of investors. See Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly's Done: The Bar's Struggle

with the SEC, 103 CoLuM. L. REv. 1236, 1238 (2003) (asserting that the ABA's battles with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have "[left] lawyers free to continue helping
major corporations deceive the investing public"). The problem Professor Koniak considered
involves an assertion by the profession of a norm-a near-absolute duty of confidentiality-that
conflicts with a more pro-disclosure norm favored by the SEC, Congress (in the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act), and many state courts applying the common law of fraud. See Susan P. Koniak, The Law

Between the Barand the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389, 1427, 1462 (1992). The cases on ineffective
assistance of counsel, by contrast, generally do not involve a conflict between the norms supported
by the legal profession and those preferred by other institutions. Instead, they involve the frequent

failure of both institutions to take these norms seriously.
119. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT rr. 1.1 (competence), 1.3 (diligence), 1.4
cmt. I (communication), 1.7 cmt. I (loyalty) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015).
120. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl.

¶

16 ("Compliance with the Rules, as

with all law in an open society, depends primarily upon understanding and voluntary compliance,
secondarily upon reinforcement by peer and public opinion and finally, when necessary, upon
enforcement through disciplinary proceedings.").
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including contempt of court, money damages for negligence,
disqualification from representation, and disgorgement of earned fees. 12 1
Similarly, it is a misstatement-common enough, but inaccurate
nonetheless-to assert that the prevailing customs and norms of the legal
profession set the standard of effective representation under the Sixth
Amendment.1 2 2 Uncritical deference to prevailing practices may have the
effect of ratifying incompetent representation. 12 3 Yet Justice O'Connor
was right to be concerned about the independence of the legal profession
from excessive regulation by the judiciary.1 2 4 The truth of the matter is
that the judiciary and the legal profession gradually establish standards
of effective representation in a back-and-forth process. As Justice John
Paul Stevens wrote in Padillav. Kentucky,1 2 5 the constitutional standard
depends upon "the practice and expectation of the legal community," and
the profession's own internal norms, including the rules of professional
conduct, are not conclusive authority but guides to assessing
competence.1 2 6 This means that when the Supreme Court establishes an
important new legal principle, as it did in Martinez,127 it may take awhile
for the legal profession to adjust to the change. Post-conviction lawyers
need to identify the ethical obligations required in light of the holding in
Martinez that ineffective assistance of counsel in state post-conviction
proceedings may serve as cause to excuse what would otherwise be a
procedural default. Courts must also work through the ramifications of
Martinez. For example, given the responsibility of counsel to identify
conflicts and bring them to the attention of the court,1 28 are courts
warranted in continuing to rely on lawyers when there are reasons to
believe that the lawyer's prior negligence is the source of the conflict? As
the following Part shows, lawyers outside the criminal defense context
121.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§

6 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).

122. See Russell Stetler & W. Bradley Wendel, The ABA Guidelines and the Norms of
Capital Defense Representation, 41 HOFSTRA L. REv. 635, 651-53 (2013) (arguing that in
ineffective assistance of counsel cases, "courts should look to what actors should do as opposed

to what they sometimes do in fact").
123. Id. at 663-64.
124. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1984) ("Any such set of rules
would interfere with the constitutionally protected independence of counsel and restrict the wide
latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions.").

125. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
126. Id. at 366-67.
127. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1320 (2012); see supra text accompanying note 17.

128. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 485-86 (1978) (stating that "[a]n 'attorney
representing two defendants in a criminal matter is in the best position professionally and ethically
to determine when a conflict of interest exists or will probably develop in the course of a trial'"
and that "defense attorneys have the obligation, upon discovering a conflict of interests, to advise
the court at once of the problem" (quoting State v. Davis, 514 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Ariz. 1973) (en

banc))).
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have long struggled with the conflicts of interest that arise from credible
allegations of their own incompetence within an ongoing professional
relationship.1 29 Courts working their way through the puzzle of Martinez
may find these approaches instructive as far as they go, keeping in mind
that the unique features of capital defense representation may limit their
utility.
II.

"PRIOR WORK" CONFLICTS IN THEIR NATURAL ENVIRONMENT,

Martinez is implicated when a lawyer representing a petitioner in
federal habeas proceedings also represented that person in state postconviction proceedings.' 3 0 If the lawyer unreasonably failed to raise a
meritorious claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in the state
courts, then counsel's deficient performance can excuse the procedural
default for failing to raise the claim in the right court at the right time.131
As discussed above, this failure can satisfy the "cause" requirement,
which allows federal courts to adjudicate otherwise procedurally barred
claims.1 32 Given Martinez's creation of a new path to a merits review of
previously barred claims, attorneys representing petitioners in federal
habeas corpus proceedings-who were also state post-conviction
counsel-are now required to assess the quality of their prior
representation. This assessment involves taking into account the potential
benefits to the client of continuity of representation, including counsel's
familiarity with the record and any hard-won relationship of trust that
may have developed between the client and lawyer.
Setting aside the constitutional framework for judging the
performance of counsel, as well as the complexities of procedural default
under AEDPA, what would a "pure" analysis look like under the state
rules of professional conduct? To help answer this question, imagine a
situation roughly analogous to the Martinez dilemma, only in the context
of the representation of a client in civil litigation. A common version of
this scenario involves a law firm that represented a client in a
transactional, advising, or regulatory matter and subsequently attempted
to represent the client in litigation in which resolution of one of the issues
in dispute implicates the advice given by the firm or the actions it had
recommended the client take.13 3 Other cases involve successive
129.
130.
131.
132.

See
See
See
See

infra text accompanying notes 137-39.
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1313.
id. at 1315.
id. at 1320; supra text accompanying note 17.

133. See, e.g., Red Zone LLC v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, 988 N.Y.S.2d 588
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2014) (statute of limitations on malpractice claim did not begin to run
while law firm that had made mistakes in transactional representation continued to negotiate and
litigate over the contract); St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, McLean, Exley & Dunn, P.C.,
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representation in litigation.1 3 4 They all pose not only the "endgame"
question of when a conflict of interest burdens a lawyer so much that it is
impermissible to proceed with the representation, but also the much more
subtle and complicated issue of how to proceed in the middle of a
representation when either there is an allegation of incompetence or the
lawyer comes to realize that she made a mistake that affects the client's
legal interests. 13 5
All of these so-called "prior-work" conflicts issues share a similar
dynamic. The claim that a lawyer provided incompetent representation at
least potentially creates a conflict between the interests of the client and
the lawyer's personal interest in avoiding liability, discipline, or even
embarrassment for having been careless. The lawyer may want to take
steps to defend her pocketbook or reputation, including resisting the
746 S.E.2d 98 (Ga. 2013) (analyzing intra-firm attorney-client privilege issues arising out of a
lawsuit threat issued by a current client of the law firm in real estate matters); Koen Book Distribs.
v. Powell, Trachtman, Logan, Carrie, Bowman & Lombardo, P.C., 212 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. Pa.
2002) (determining first whether conflict of interest related to prior representation existed before
analyzing attorney-client privilege and work product issues); Eurocom S.A. v. Mahoney, Cohen

& Co., 522. F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (disqualifying law firm from representing corporation
in negligence action against accountant where law firm had allegedly also been negligent and
firm's negligence, if proven, would reduce the corporation's recovery under principles of
comparative negligence); Veras Inv. Partners LLC v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, 17

Misc.3d 1103(A), 2007 WL 2792175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, Sept. 27, 2007) (outlining
malpractice theory based on law firms previous advice to and subsequent representation in

litigation of hedge fund managers).
134. See, e.g., Crews v. Cty. of Nassau, No. 06-CV-2610, 2007 WL 316568, at *6 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 30, 2007) (disqualifying a lawyer who had represented a criminal defendant from
representing the same client as a plaintiff in a civil rights action because the lawyer's personal
interest in concealing alleged errors in the underlying criminal action posed a "significant risk of
trial taint" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Glueck v. Jonathan Logan, Inc., 653 F.2d

746, 748 (2d Cir. 1981))); Jamieson v. Slater, No. CV 06-1524-PHX-SMM, 2006 WL 3421788,
at *8 (D. Ariz. Nov. 27, 2006) (holding that a non-waivable conflict exists when an attorney is a
co-defendant with a client in a malicious prosecution lawsuit); Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano,
Halleran & Ciesla, 662 A.2d 509, 512 (N.J. 1995) (discussing a malpractice claim against a law
firm that represented a client in litigation, made a mistake in settlement negotiations that caused
prejudice to the client, and subsequently withdrew as counsel due to a conflict of interest),
abrogated by Olds v. Donnelly, 696 A.2d 633 (N.J. 1997).
135. See, e.g., Colo. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 113 (2005) ("When, by act or
omission, a lawyer has made an error, and that error is likely to result in prejudice to a client's
right or claim, the lawyer must promptly disclose the error to the client."); Conn. Bar Ass'n Prof I

Ethics Comm., Informal Op. 2014-05 (2014) (holding that no conflict of interest existed where a
lawyer promptly communicated a mistake to the client and took steps to ameliorate it); N.Y. State

Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof I Ethics, Ethics Op. 734 (2000) (noting that, ordinarily, a lawyer "has
an obligation to report to the client that [she] has made a significant error or omission that may
give rise to a possible malpractice claim"). See generally Anthony V. Alfieri, Law Firm
Malpractice Disclosure: Illustrations and Guidelines, 42 HOFSTRA L. REv. 17, 46-53 (2013)
(discussing the "best practice guidelines applicable to law firm malpractice disclosure disputes").
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client's legitimate requests for information or asserting defenses that
claim contributory misconduct by the client; these steps may harm the
client. The lawyer's understandable desire to protect herself conflicts
with the bedrock principle that a lawyer owes a fiduciary duty to the client
at all times during the existence of an attorney-client relationship and
must always put the client's interests first.1 3 6 The lawyer may also
become so preoccupied with defending against allegations of misconduct
that the client's case suffers from neglect. A further difficulty is that it
may not be clear at the time whether the lawyer actually committed
malpractice or provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Not all
assertions of error have merit, and the lawyer may believe that her
conduct was reasonable. Of course, if an allegation is serious and
credible, a lawyer has a duty to inform the client of this fact, advise the
client of the best way to protect her rights, and obtain the client's
informed consent to the conflict if the lawyer wishes to continue
representing the client.1 3 7 But a lawyer need not go through the procedure
of explaining the possible conflict and obtaining informed consent every
time something goes wrong that an aggrieved client might characterize
as the result of negligence. A lawyer is therefore in the unenviable
position of having to decide how to advise her client on the client's rights
to assert claims regarding the lawyer's negligence while remaining
immersed in the ongoing representation of the client in the underlying
matter. The lawyer's involvement on behalf of the client makes it
extremely difficult to adopt the necessary stance of detachment from
which it would be possible to evaluate whether she had provided
competent services to the client. The conflicts rules, which contemplate
the lawyer providing independent advice to the client as part of the
process of obtaining informed consent, are not well designed to handle a
situation in which allegations of her own misconduct in representation
potentially diminish the lawyer's capacity to provide this advice. Yet, a
per se rule of disqualification would fail to reflect the reality that many
allegations of malpractice or ineffective assistance of counsel are not
well-founded. At the very least a lawyer should be entitled, and
encouraged, to seek legal advice concerning what to do in light of an
allegation of misconduct.' 3 8 Beyond that, however, the situation becomes
136. See Koen Book Distribs., 212 F.R.D. at 286 (stating that a firm's fiduciary duty to its

clients is paramount to the firm's own interests).
137. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.4 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015); see also, e.g., Garvy

v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP, 966 N.E.2d 523, 528 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (describing how the law firm
advised the client to consider obtaining separate counsel due to conflicts created by malpractice
allegations).
138. See N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Prof I Ethics, Ethics Op. 789 (2005), at ¶ 13
(explaining that, although concurrent conflicts rule does not preclude consultation with in-house
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considerably more murky.
For the purposes of illustrating a civil analogue to the Martinez
dilemma, consider the following hypothetical representation based on a
well-known legal malpractice case. 139 Lawyer represents Dealership, an
automobile dealership, located on a parcel of land owned by Landlord.
Dealership and Landlord have a thirty-year lease, which includes a
provision that the parties renew the lease and renegotiate the amount of
rent at five-year intervals. In the negotiations, Landlord proposed a
complex formula for setting the amount of rent using the Consumer Price
Index (CPI) as published by the U.S. Department of Labor. Lawyer
conveyed this offer to his client, President of Dealership, and President
asked, "What do you think?" Lawyer had taken a course in law school on
accounting for lawyers but was not otherwise trained as an accountant or
economist. Based on his knowledge and his general inclination to trust
Landlord, Lawyer advised his client that the proposed formula was fair.
On behalf of Dealership, President signed the lease renewal. The next
month, President was horrified when she discovered that Landlord had
increased the amount of Dealership's rent by $37,000 per month. She sent
a copy of the lease to Dealership's accountant, who quickly discovered
the problem: rather than basing the amount of rent on an average, of
percentage increases in the CPI, Landlord based the new formula on
actual increases in CPI, which had the effect of locking in temporary price
increases. President informed Lawyer of the problem and asked for his
advice.
Suppose under state law there is some basis for arguing that the parties
did not have a meeting of the minds over the formula for calculating rent
increases. Lawyer reviews the applicable cases and concludes there is
about a fifty-percent chance of successfully voiding the lease renewal on
the basis of a mutual mistake in fact. Lawyer also calls Landlord to
explore the possibility of agreeing to modify the formula for calculating
rent increases, but Landlord tells Lawyer to pound sand.
What should Lawyer do? Keeping in mind that the client has the
authority to make decisions about the objectives of the representation, 140
but that a lawyer should communicate all information necessary to enable
the client to make informed decisions about the representation, 14 1 what
counsel about potential malpractice claim, a firm's conclusion that it may have committed
malpractice may affect its independent professional judgment and therefore be a conflict of
interest).
139. Loosely based, with a few embellishments, on Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano,

Halleran & Ciesla, 662 A.2d 509, 511 (N.J. 1995). For additional analysis of this case, which is
well known in the legal ethics and malpractice community but perhaps not elsewhere, see Nancy
J. Moore, Implications of Circle Chevrolet for Attorney Malpractice and Attorney Ethics, 28
RUTGERS L.J. 57 (1996).
140. MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a).
141. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.4(b).
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advice should he give to the client, what alternative courses of action
should he recommend, and how strongly should he urge the client to take
his advice? Imagine three versions of the next chapter of the story:
1. Ignore the Problem. Lawyer advises President that, in his
judgment, it would be in the best interests of Dealership to
file a declaratory judgment action seeking to void the lease
renewal. The action would give Dealership leverage and
likely induce Landlord to agree to a less onerous formula
based on average CPI increases. Lawyer also recommends
that Dealership's accountant be involved in any future
decisions relating to the calculation of rent payments.
President asks, "What other options do I have?" to which
Lawyer responds, "Pay the increased rent." President
reluctantly authorizes Lawyer to file the declaratory
judgment action.
2. The Most Conservative Approach. Lawyer is aware of
cases stating that "an attorney who realizes he or she has
made a mistake must immediately notify the client of the
mistake as well as the client's right to obtain new counsel
and sue the attorney for negligence." 4 2 Lawyer calls
President, offers to resign as counsel, and informs President
that she has a right to retain a separate attorney and file a
malpractice lawsuit. "Are you crazy?" responds President,
"You have represented Dealership for years, and I am not
about to terminate that relationship over one little mistake.
Do what you think is best for the company."
3. The Lawyerly Approach. Lawyer practices in a law firm
that is large enough to have an in-house liability, lossprevention, and ethics partner. Lawyer consults with Partner,
seeking advice concerning how to proceed. Partner, who
does not have the same direct personal involvement with the
case that Lawyer does, asks Lawyer to describe all of the
facts pertaining to the negotiation of the lease renewal,
including Lawyer's understanding of the formula for
calculating rent. Partner also asks Lawyer to explain the
reasoning underlying his judgment that Dealership should
agree to the proposed rent formula. An issue arising for
lawyers practicing in firms with in-house counsel is whether
the attorney-client privilege protects these intra-firm
communications from discovery. 43 Dealership may want to
142. Circle Chevrolet, 662 A.2d at 514.
143. See, e.g., St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, MacLean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 746

S.E.2d 98, 102 (Ga. 2013); RFF Family P'ship v. Bums & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066,
1067-68 (Mass. 2013); Palmer v. Superior Court, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 620, 623 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014);
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know the reasons underlying Lawyer's advice about how it
should proceed. However, because Lawyer has a personal
interest in avoiding liability or discipline, he is entitled to
obtain legal advice about how best to proceed in view of
these risks. This is not just a technical issue; rather, it reveals
something important about the nature of prior-work
conflicts-the legal interests of the lawyer and client may
diverge when there is a credible allegation of misconduct.
In this hypothetical, it is fairly clear that Lawyer made a mistake in
the negotiation of the lease renewal. Nevertheless, Dealership may have
good reasons to wish to continue Lawyer's representation, including the
transaction costs that would result from having to locate substitute
counsel and bring the new lawyer up to speed on the matter. Assume,
therefore, that Dealership decided to stay with Lawyer and directed him
to file the declaratory judgment action. With the consent of the parties,
the judge conducted a bench trial and concluded that there was no mistake
of fact. In her written decision, the judge stated that one element of the
mutual mistake doctrine was the mistake by both parties or their agents
VersusLaw, Inc. v. Stoel Rives, LLP, Ill P.3d 866, 878 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005); TattleTale Alarm
Sys., Inc. v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold, LLP, No. 2:10-CV-226, 2011 WL 382627 (S.D. Ohio
Feb. 3, 2011), at *1-2; Thelen Reid & Priest LLP v. Marland, No. C 06-2071 VRW, 2007 WL
578989 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2007), at *6; Koen Book Distribs. v. Powell, Trachtman, Logan,
Carrie, Bowman & Lombardo, 212 F.R.D. 283, 284 (E.D. Pa. 2002); Bank Brussels Lambert v.
Credit Lyonnais (Suisse), S.A., 220 F. Supp. 2d 283, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); In re SonicBlue, Inc.,
No. 07-5082, 2008 WL 170562 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2008), at *8-9. See generallyElizabeth
Chambliss, The Scope of In-Firm Privilege, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1721, 1723 (2005)
(addressing "the scope of the attorney-client privilege between law firm in-house counsel and
other members of the firm"). Under the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege, firstand highly influentially-articulated in the context of shareholder derivative actions in Garnerv.
Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1103-04 (5th Cir. 1970), a party with a fiduciary duty cannot shield
from the beneficiary communications with a legal advisor on matters related to the fiduciary's
breach of duty. The prior-work conflict of the lawyer representing the client is analogous to a
corporate manager's breach of fiduciary duty. An alternative route to the conclusion that intrafirm communications concerning potential malpractice are not privileged is the imputation of
conflicts of interest to all lawyers associated in a firm. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r.
1.10(a). Under a strict application of the imputation rule, the firm's in-house lawyers-whose job
it is to advise the firm on its own legal obligations-"have developed interests adverse to those
of the firm's client." St. Simons Waterfront, 746 S.E.2d at 105. Nevertheless, many courts,
including the highest courts in Massachusetts and Georgia, have concluded that the firm's interest
in receiving legal advice, which is no different from that of any other client, prevails over the
client's interest in obtaining information concerning the firm's breach of its duty of care. See St.
Simons Waterfront, 746 S.E.2d at 107-08; RFF Family P'ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080. As the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded, a law firm may have its own interests, such as
in the defense of litigation brought or threatened by a client, on which it is entitled to seek
confidential legal advice, even while providing complete and candid disclosure of the facts
relevant to the client's interests, including communications with legal advisors. See RFF Family
P'ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1076.
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regarding a material fact. The judge noted that Lawyer had testified at
trial (which the judge had concluded was permissible since it was a bench
trial)'" that he had not made a mistake in reviewing the CPI formula. As
her opinion observed, "perhaps Lawyer was motivated to minimize the
possibility that he made a mistake by the understandable hesitation to
admit to having been negligent in representing Dealership." The judge
went on to note that there may have been grounds for reforming the lease
agreement on the basis of an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing but that Dealership had waived that claim by not asserting it in
its complaint.
A. Theory of Conflict
Under the Model Rules, a conflict of interest exists if the
representation of a client would be materially limited by (among other
things) a personal interest of the lawyer.' 45 The
lawyer's
personal
interest creates a material limitation on the representation if "there is a
significant risk that a lawyer's ability to consider, recommend or carry
out an appropriate course of action for the client" will be limited by the
lawyer's own interests, 14 6 including avoiding liability for malpractice or
preserving his reputation.1 47 A court or disciplinary authority will
evaluate conflicts of interest functionally.1 48 That is, it will ask whether
the competing interest, such as duties owed to another client or the
lawyer's own interests, creates a significant likelihood of interfering with
the lawyer's ability to fulfill the lawyer's duties to the client.1 4 9 Those
duties include providing competent representation, keeping confidences,
exercising independent judgment on the client's behalf, and making
decisions based solely on the lawyer's best assessment of what is best for

144. Cf MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.7 (lawyer as witness). The prohibition on
acting as an advocate and a witness at trial is intended to prevent confusion of the trier of fact. Id.
cmt. 2. The trial court may balance the danger of confusion with the prejudice to the client if the

lawyer does not testify. Id. cmt. 4.
145. Id. r.1.7(a)(2).
146. Id r. 1.7 cmt. 8. The New York conflicts rule uses the language "differing interests" but
the substance of the analysis is the same. See Roy D. SIMON, SIMON'S NEW YORK RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT ANNOTATED 306-14 (2013).
147. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-384 (1994)
(recognizing that "the representation of [a] client may be materially limited by the lawyer's own

interest in avoiding discipline").
148. Several classic conflicts cases establish this functional mode of analysis. See Brennan's,
Inc. v. Brennan's Rests., Inc., 590 F.2d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 1979); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir. 1978); Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Levin, 579
F.2d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 1978); Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (2d Cir.
1976).
149. See cases cited supra note 148.
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the client. Importantly, the conflicts rules are risk rules, not harm rules. 50
A conflict exists if there is a significant risk of interference with
professional values such as loyalty and independence."s5 Actual harm to
the client is not an element of a conflict of interest, as understood in the
civil litigation or transactional context. To put it another way, there is
really no difference between actual and potential conflicts for purposes
of the rules of professional conduct. If there is a significant risk that the
attorney's personal interests would materially limit the representation of
a client, there is a conflict of interest, period.1 5 2
A significant source of confusion when considering the relationship
between the Sixth Amendment and conflict-of-interest doctrine under the
rules of professional conduct is the distinction between actual and
potential conflicts in Cuyler v. Sullivan. 15 3 Because the conflict-ofinterest provisions of the disciplinary rules are risk rules, not harm rules,
there is really no such thing as a "potential" conflict under the rules.1 5 4
Either a risk of material limitation is sufficiently significant to trigger the
55
requirements of informed consent and waiver, or there is no conflict.'
150. See Kevin McMunigal, Rethinking Attorney Conflict of Interest Doctrine, 5 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 823, 839 (1992) ("Much of conflict of interest doctrine reflects a risk avoidance

approach.").
151. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 1.
152. Id. r. 1.7(a)(2); see HAZARD ET AL., supra note 32, § 10.4, at 10-13 ("[I]n modem
thinking about conflicts of interest, it is no longer appropriate to speak of 'potential' versus
'actual' conflicts of interest. Instead, these terms, if they are used at all, must have reference to

the degree of likelihood that the risk-the potentiality-will ripen into adverse effect-the
actuality.").

153. 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980) (holding that "to demonstrate a violation of his Sixth
Amendment rights, a defendant must establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected
his lawyer's performance" as opposed to a "possible conflict of interest"); see People v. Holmes,

565 N.E.2d 950, 956, 958 (111. 1990) (attempting to impose some order on labels such as "potential
conflict" and "possible conflict").
154. That statement is true regarding the ABA Model Rules and the forty-nine states that
have disciplinary rules based on the Model Rules. See supra text accompanying note 78.
California, however, retains an idiosyncratic regulatory scheme, with a blend of court rules and
statutes. See supra note 78. The California conflicts of interest rule refers to the distinction
between actual and potential conflicts. See CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3-310(C)(l)-(2)

(2015), http://rules.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/10/documents/2015_CalifomiaRulesofProfessionalCon
duct.pdf. Judicial interpretation of the rule has brought it closer to the Model Rules. California
courts have held that a potential conflict cannot be purely hypothetical but must be an identifiable
scenario in which it is reasonably likely that an actual conflict will arise. See Havasu Lakeshore

Invs., LLC v. Fleming, 158 Cal. Rptr. 3d 311, 319 (Ct. App. 2013); Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc.
v. Paladino, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906, 913 (Ct. App. 2001). Thus, in Model Rules terms, what the
California rules refer to as a potential conflict is one in which duties owed to another client
materially limit the lawyer's representation of a client. Cf MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r.

1.7(a)(2).
155. See discussion infra Sections I.B, II.C; see also Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153,
162 (1988) (holding that a district court may refuse to accept waivers of conflict because it has an
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For Sixth Amendment purposes, however, federal courts do use the
language of actual and potential conflicts.15 6 In Cuyler, two private
lawyers jointly represented John Sullivan, one of three codefendants in a
murder case. 157 Sullivan did not raise an objection to the concurrent
representation.1 58 After his conviction, Sullivan filed an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim based on a conflict of interest arising from the
concurrent representation. 159 Because his lawyers did not object, Sullivan
was required to show that "potential conflicts impermissibly imperil[ed]
his right to a fair trial" 60 -that they were in a sense actual conflicts. As
the Court put it, "a defendant who raised no objection at trial must
demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his
lawyer's performance."'61 One must be careful here, however, because
the definition of "actual conflict" has a great deal in common with the
way the state rules of professional conduct understand the conflicts
provisions as risk rules. Most importantly, an actual conflict does not
equate with Strickland prejudice-a showing that there is a reasonable
likelihood that but for the conflict, the result of the trial would have been
different. 162 Rather, once an attorney has an actual conflict of interest, the
court presumes prejudice.1 63 What, then, is an actual conflict of interest
if not something that likely had an effect on the outcome of the trial?
Considering the cases cited by the Court in Cuyler and the interpretation
of Cuyler by subsequent cases, it is apparent that the standard of an
"actual conflict of interest [that] adversely affected" the performance of
counsel 64 is not a two-element test. In other words, an actual conflict is
one that adversely affects counsel's performance, as opposed to a merely
theoretical possibility of an interference with the loyalties of the

obligation to monitor proceedings for conflicts and must do so from "the murkier pretrial context
when relationships between parties are seen through a glass, darkly").

156.
157.
158.
435 U.S.

See, e.g., Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350.
Id. at 337.
Id. at 337-38. The lack of objection distinguishes the case from Holloway v. Arkansas,
475, 477 (1978), where the trial court refused to investigate the possibility of a conflict

of interest despite the lawyer's timely objection to being appointed to represent three codefendants
concurrently.

159. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 338.
160. Id. at 348.
161. Id.

162. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). The Court decided Cuyler
before Stric/dand, so obviously it could not have explicitly made reference to the second,
prejudice prong of Strickland, but subsequent cases have made the relationship between these two

standards clear. See, e.g., Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166, 168, 171 (2002).
163. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-50.
164. Id. at 350.
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lawyer. 1 6 5 This is somewhere between the Model Rule 1.7(a)(2) standard
of a significant risk of a material limitation on the representation, on the
one hand, and a showing of actual harm or Strickland prejudice on the
other.
To emphasize, concluding that a conflict of interest does not invoke
the presumption of prejudice under Cuyler does not take the conduct out
from the state disciplinary rules. For example, a lawyer who obtains
media rights to a portrayal based on information relating to the
representation of a client violates a clear and unambiguous provision in
the state disciplinary rules. 16 6 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit has held, however, that the client must still show Strickland
prejudice to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based
on this conflict of interest. 16 7 Whatever one thinks of the court's
reasoning in Beets, there is no suggestion that the lawyer's conduct was
anything other than an act of self-interest that breached the lawyer's
fundamental fiduciary obligation to his client. The court lists other types
of conflict for which the second prong of Stricklandmust be satisfied and,
like the media-rights case, all are clear violations of the disciplinary
rules-accepting a case when the lawyer is too busy to handle it
competently; accepting payment from someone other than the client
without obtaining the client's informed consent; and continuing to
represent a client when it is likely that the attorney will be called as a
witness.1 6 8 There is a conflict in all of these cases-the lawyer acted
the inapplicability of the Cuyler
improperly-notwithstanding
presumption. Interestingly, the court mentions a fourth situation: "An
attorney has neglected to file a competency motion. To cover up the
mistake, it is alleged, he tardily files an inadequate motion." 69 This is
exactly the problem considered here and, regardless of whether it falls
within the Cuyler presumption, it is clearly a conflict of interest under the
rules.
In the hypothetical discussed above, in Model Rules terms, what did
Lawyer do wrong that constituted a conflict of interest? Obviously he
erred by misunderstanding rent calculation under the new formula
proposed by Landlord. But that is a simple failure of competence, not a
conflict of interest. A conflict requires a substantial likelihood of
interference with the performance of a duty that counsel owes to the
165. See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 171 (.'[A]n actual conflict of interest' mean[s] precisely a
conflict that affected counsel's performance-as opposed to a mere theoretical division of

loyalties.").
166. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.8(d) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015).

167. Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1266-69 (5th Cir. 1995).
168. Id. at 1271; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT rr. 1.1, 1.8(f), 3.7.
169. Beets, 65 F.3d at 1271.
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client. 7 0 The conflict manifests itself later, when Lawyer is advising his
client, Dealership, acting through its duly authorized agent, President,
about what to do next. Lawyer's own interest may be to cover up or
minimize the mistake, and this interest may cause him to be excessively
optimistic when reading the cases on the mistake-of-fact defense. This
personal interest materially limits Lawyer's representation of Dealership
because it creates a significant risk that Lawyer will not be able to advise
Dealership competently and provide the independent advice owed to the
client. 17 1 The essence of the conflict is the failure of Lawyer's impartiality
caused by Lawyer's own interest in avoiding liability or discipline.
B. Waivability
Under the Model Rules, most concurrent conflicts of interest are
consentable or waivable (used interchangeably) with full disclosure.
Certain conflicts are not waivable, however.1 7 2 The three categories of
non-waivable conflicts are (i) representations prohibited by law, 1 7 3 (ii)
assertion of a claim against another client represented by the lawyer in
the same litigation,' 74 and (iii) conflicts so severe that the lawyer could
not reasonably believe it possible to provide competent and diligent
representation to both clients.1 7 5 Categories (i) and (ii) state per se rules
of non-waivability but are relatively narrow in scope. In criminal defense
representation and in the context of prior-work conflicts, non-waivable
conflicts will generally fall within the third category. A non-consentable
conflict would arise from a mistake so serious that no reasonable lawyer
could believe it is possible to provide effective representation to the client
while worrying about her own potential liability.
Many conflicts may be waivable in theory, but for practical reasons it
170. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 8 (explaining when a conflict will
rise to a violation of the rule).

171. See id r. 1.7(a)(2) (addressing material-limitation conflicts); id r. 1.1 (addressing
competence); id. r. 2.1 (addressing independence).
172. Id. r. 1.7(b). The non-waivability provision of the concurrent conflicts rule is drafted
negatively, so it actually states conditions for a conflict to be waivable. That is, a conflict is
waivable if it does not fall into one of the three specified categories. See id
173. Id. r. 1.7(b)(2). This is a relatively limited category of non-waivable conflicts, the most
common instance of which is when a statute or regulation applicable to a former government

official prohibits a lawyer from representing a client in private practice. See id. r. 1.7 cmt. 16;
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 122 cmt. g(i) (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
174. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b)(3). Note that this standard differs from one
of the tests for defining a conflict of interest. A conflict may exist if the interests of one client are

directly adverse to the interests of another client of the lawyer or law firm. Id. r. 1.7(a)(1). The
conflict is only non-waivable, however, if the lawyer or firm attempts to represent both sides of

the litigation simultaneously. Id. r. 1.7(b)(3).
175. Id r. 1.7(b)(1); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

g(iii).

§

122 cmt.
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may be impossible to obtain informed consent. A frequent scenario in
private practice, though unlikely to arise in criminal defense
representation, occurs when the lawyer has confidential information
regarding one client that the lawyer would ordinarily have to disclose to
another client as part of the process of obtaining both clients' informed
consent to a conflict of interest. 17 6 A problem more likely to exist in the
Martinez dilemma is that the lawyer's own involvement in the ineffective
representation makes it difficult for the lawyer to provide the kind of
candid, impartial disclosure to which the client is entitled. This is
technically a failure of informed consent, not an evaluation of the conflict
as non-waivable. A further problem that may arise in the case of multiple
representation in a criminal defense matter, but not civil litigation, is that
the district court has the authority to decline to accept waivers of conflicts
of interest. 1 7 7 A lawyer may believe a conflict is waivable and obtain the
client's informed consent, yet the court may nevertheless disqualify the
lawyer under Rule 44(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
C. Informed Consent andIts Limitations
If a conflict is consentable-and most are-informed consent requires
that the lawyer provide full disclosure of "the relevant circumstances and
of the material and reasonably foreseeable ways that the conflict could
have adverse effects on the interests of that client."l 7 8 The purpose of the
176. See, e.g., Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Formal Op. 2005-02 (2005).
177. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160-63 (1988). If the district court is too
deferential to prosecutors who are insisting on the disqualification of defense counsel for some
highly speculative theory of a conflict, the result may be to deprive defendants of the counsel of
their choice-and sometimes highly effective defense counsel-with no corresponding gain in
the protection afforded by the conflicts rules to either the interests of defendants or the integrity
of the adversarial process. See Bruce A. Green, "Through a Glass, Darkly ": How the Court Sees
Motions to Disqualify Criminal Defense Lawyers, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1201, 1250 (1989) ("The
defendant has an interest in receiving the effective assistance of counsel, in receiving the

assistance of his attorney of choice, and in deciding for himself whether to undertake the risks
attendant to counsel's potential conflict. These interests are obviously undermined by the defense
counsel's disqualification, which may deprive the defendant of the possible strategic advantage

of being represented by a particular attorney and may derogate his interest in deciding for himself
whether to continue with an attorney who may have a conflict or to seek different

representation.").
178. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 18. "Informed consent" is a defined term
in the Model Rules. See id. r. 1.0(e) (defining "informed consent" as the "agreement by a person

to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and
explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed
course of conduct"). The 1983 version of the Model Rules used the term "consent after

consultation." See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof's Responsibility, Formal Op. 05-436 (2005)
(noting that in 2002 the ABA Commission of Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
replaced the term "consent after consultation" with the term "informed consent"). Although the
term "informed consent" is preferable, due to its association-drawn intentionally by the drafters
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informed-consent standard is to permit the client to make an autonomous
decision to proceed with the representation despite the existence of a
conflict. The client may decide, for example, that the cost and
inconvenience of switching lawyers is not worth it, given what the client
perceives as only a slight risk that a conflict of interest will impair the
lawyer's ability to provide competent and diligent representation. The
overarching idea of informed consent is that many decisions regarding
the representation are for the client to make, but the lawyer must give the
client sufficient information to participate intelligently in the decisionmaking process.' 79 The lawyer has a fiduciary duty to act in her client's
best interests, as the client defines them, after consultation. 8 0 The agency
or fiduciary model of allocation of decision-making authority, recognized
by the common law of agency and the Model Rules,' 8' presupposes both
the client's ability to participate in the decision-making process and the
attorney's ability (and willingness) to communicate all relevant
information. Because clients frequently lack the expertise necessary to
make decisions about their legal rights and liabilities, they are necessarily
dependent upon their lawyer. The attorney and client thus have
coordinating roles in decision-making. The client has the final authority
with respect to the objectives of the representation, but the lawyer owes
the client fully informed, candid, and impartial advice by a lawyer acting
solely in the client's best interests.
The informed-consent standard is similar to the "knowing and
intelligent waiver" test used in many areas of criminal procedure. For
example, the Supreme Court in Moran v. Burbine,1 82 evaluating a waiver
of a suspect's Miranda rights, asked whether the suspect waived those
rights with "full awareness of both the nature of the right being
abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it." 1 83 The
informed-consent standard in civil conflicts-of-interest law "requires that
each affected client be aware of the material respects in which the
of the Ethics 2000 version of the Model Rules-with the doctrine of informed consent in medical
malpractice law, the older term "consent after consultation" does have the virtue of reminding
lawyers that they first have an obligation to consult with their clients before seeking the client's

waiver. See HAZARD ET AL., supra note 32, § 10.8, at 10-23 (emphasizing the initial step of full
disclosure to the client of all aspects of the conflict). See generally Susan R. Martyn, Informed
Consent in the Practiceof Law, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 307 (1980) (tracing the development of

informed consent in medical malpractice law and the law governing lawyers).
179. HAZARD ET AL., supra note 32, § 7.4, at 7-7 ("If the client is to make turning-point

decisions about his legal affairs, he must be armed with sufficient information for intelligent
decisionmaking.").
180. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a).
181. See id
182. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
183. Id. at 421.
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representation could have adverse effects on the interests of that
client." 84 Conflicts involving credible allegations of attorney misconduct
present a difficult variation on the problem of obtaining informed
consent. In the prior-work conflicts hypothetical this Article considers,
the issue is not merely that the adverse effect of the lawyer's mistake on
the client's interests might be expensive and time-consuming to unwind,
and might have further consequences down the line. The further adverse
effect is that the attorney's reluctance to "fess up" to a mistake
compromises the lawyer's own ability to give that advice. The lawyer's
inability to provide fully candid, impartial advice impairs the client's
capacity to make fully informed decisions concerning the
representation.1

Complicating the process of providing full disclosure is the possibility
that the lawyer's desire not to admit his mistakes may operate at an
unconscious level. In an important article on lawyer liability for aiding
and abetting client fraud, Professor Don Langevoort reviews the
empirical literature on social cognition and concludes that certain
cognitive effects present an obstacle to lawyers perceiving the warning
signs of fraud.1 86 Importantly, many of these processes occur at-the
unconscious or "preconscious" level, so the actor sincerely believes she
is acting rationally.' 8 7 For example, once someone is committed to a
position, "the subsequent discovery of information that indicates harmful
consequences flowing from that commitment directly threatens their selfconcept as good, worthwhile individuals," with the result that the person
suppresses or ignores certain information that should function as a "red
flag" warning of danger.' 8 8 The phenomenon of escalating
commitment-gamblers doubling down on a losing hand or bankers
throwing good money after bad-can be explained in this way.1 89 In the
case of prior-work conflicts caused by the lawyer's malpractice, it is
likely that the lawyer ignored at least some evidence of having made a
mistake and will therefore not be in a position to provide the kind of
candid, impartial advice that the client deserves and is entitled to under
the doctrine of informed consent. 190
184. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§

122 cmt. c(i) (AM. LAW

INST. 2000).
185. See Martyn, supra note 178, at 330 (recognizing the material impairment to a client's
decision-making when the lawyer has not fully informed the client).
186. See Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into
Lawyers' Responsibilityfor Clients'Fraud,46 VAND. L. REv. 75, 95-96 (1993).

187. Id. at 97.
188. Id at 102-03.
189. Id. at 103.
190. Pertinent to the issues considered here, Professor Tigran Eldred recently published an
application of the research on this kind of motivated reasoning to the ethical obligations of
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It is important to stress that this occurs unconsciously, so that the actor
is unaware of her blind spot with respect to this evidence.' 9' A lawyer
may believe, in absolute, subjective good faith, that she has provided
effective representation to the client even though an impartial observer
not affected by the same perceptual and cognitive limitations could
discern the malpractice. An attorney may believe she is fully disclosing
to the client all material effects on the client's interests, but she will in
fact not be fully informing the client because of unconscious processes
that lead to the construal of some of the attorney's actions as not mistakes
at all. It is a natural human reaction to attempt to minimize the
responsibility for one's own failings:
Commonly, lawyers against whom [allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel] are raised react with
disappointment, outrage, and anger. When these feelings
subside, the next usual response is to develop a strategy to
defend the allegations. Unfortunately, from that point on,
many attorneys facing a claim of ineffective assistance tend
to distance themselves from the former clients and even to
create an adversarial relationship between themselves and
their former clients.' 9 2
The result of this process of an attorney coming to grips with her
mistakes, however, may be that the informed-consent standard is not
doing the work it is designed to do-allowing the client to make
autonomous decisions about whether to proceed with a representation
despite the existence of a conflict of interest-because the lawyer's
inability to perceive her mistakes clearly may interfere with the attorney's
role as the advisor to the client. To make this discussion less abstract,
return to the hypothetical of the prior-work conflict of interest but vary
the facts slightly: Imagine that President was surprised to find that the
rental payment had increased significantly and asked Lawyer to explain
why this had occurred. Lawyer is now looking back at his conduct in the
course of renegotiating the lease, considering at least two possibilities:
(1) "I screwed up" and (2) "Landlord screwed me."
predecessor counsel in capital cases. See generally Tigran W. Eldred, Motivation Matters:
Guideline 10.13 and Other Mechanisms for Preventing Lawyers from Surrendering to SelfInterest in Responding to Allegations of Ineffective Assistance in Death Penalty Cases, 42
HOFSTRA L. REv. 473 (2013).
191. See generally MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANNE. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE FAIL
TO Do WHAT'S RIGHT AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2012) (discussing ethical blind spots, the gap

between what a person wants to be and what the person actually is, and ways to be aware of and
remove these blind spots).
192. Eldred, supra note 190, at 486 (quoting Michael Mears, The Defense Attorney's Ethical
Response to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, G. B.J., Oct. 1999, at 40, 42) (alteration in

original).

2016]1

CAPITAL POST-CONVICTION REPRESENTATION

807

The unconscious psychological process of motivated reasoning makes
it likely that Lawyer will tend to attribute the explanation for the
increased rent to some trickiness or deception by Landlord. In fact, from
an objective point of view, Lawyer's conduct fell below the applicable
standard of care-"the competence and diligence normally exercised by
lawyers in similar circumstances." 19 3 But clients do not receive
information and advice from an objective point of view. Their legal
advisors, in large part, provide their understanding of the available
options and the risks and benefits associated with each of them. There is
thus a significant likelihood that Lawyer may not inform President that
the client, Dealership, has the option of filing a declaratory judgment
action to void the new lease on the ground of a mutual mistake of fact.
The informed-consent standard works only if the client has full
information, but the lawyer's dual role as provider of information and
cause of the problem limits the provision of full information. The lawyer
is responsible for ensuring that the client has adequate information, but
the lawyer's discomfiture at an accusation of making a mistake impairs
her ability to carry out this responsibility.
Would it help to require lawyers to recommend that their clients
consult with independent counsel when there is a credible allegation of
misconduct? The Model Rules suggest that "[i]n some circumstances it
may be appropriate for a lawyer to advise a client ... to seek the advice
of other counsel,"l 94 but again the operation of this norm depends on a
prior determination by the lawyer either that the lawyer made a mistake
or that an allegation of wrongdoing is credible. Clients may accuse
lawyers of malpractice absent valid grounds, and it would be unduly
cumbersome and expensive to require that lawyers recommend that their
clients consult with independent counsel whenever there is any allegation
of carelessness. It appears to be impossible to avoid the critical threshold
judgment of the existence of a conflict of interest being made by the
lawyer whose conduct has been called into question.
D. Clients with DiminishedDecision-MakingCapacity
All of this analysis of the allocation of decision-making authority in
the attorney-client relationship assumes that the client has the capacity to
understand and act upon information pertaining to his rights and options
going forward. The theoretical ground for the informed-consent doctrine
is the value of autonomy and the right of competent adult clients to make
decisions pertaining to their own well-being. 19 5 Clients with ordinary
decision-making capacity should be allowed to choose among a variety
193.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§

52(1) (AM. LAW INST.

2000).
194. MODEL RULES OF PROF'LCONDUCT r. 1.0 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2015).
195. See Martyn, supra note 178, at 312.
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of options for the representation, provided they are fully informed about
the risks and benefits of their choices. But there are many clients whose
"capacity to make adequately considered decisions in connection with the
representation is diminished ... because of minority, physical illness,
mental disability, or other cause." 1 96
In these cases, the Model Rules rather unhelpfully instruct lawyers to
maintain as normal an attorney-client relationship as possible.197 To the
extent this means only treating the client with respect, listening carefully,
and trying to ascertain the client's views about his interests, this is
perfectly sensible advice. But when it comes to making critical decisions
about the representation, lawyers cannot rely on clients with diminished
capacity to provide effective informed consent. They may have the option
to seek the appointment of a guardian to make decisions on behalf of the
client, 1 9 8 but if no representative is available to make these decisions, the
lawyer may have no choice but to muddle through, acting on the basis of
the lawyer's reasonable view of the client's interests if the client were
able to make adequately considered decisions.1 99 A lawyer's personal
interest in covering up the mistake therefore affects the lawyer who
makes a mistake in the course of representing a client with diminished
capacity at two levels-first, in recognizing the mistake and the conflict
it may have caused and second, in reaching a decision about what would
be in the client's best interests.
The diminished-capacity problem arises even for lawyers who are
completely conflict-free. Take the case of a lawyer representing a client
on death row who has instructed the lawyer that he has decided to "accept
responsibility" for his crimes and that the lawyer should waive all appeals
and should in all other respects simply acquiesce in the imposition of the
death sentence. 2 0 0 As long as the defendant has a rational and factual
understanding of the consequences of his decision, 2 0 1 which is an
extremely lenient standard for competency, he theoretically has the right
to waive his appeals. 2 0 2 In principle, this means his lawyer must "abide
by [the] client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation." 203
196. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§ 24(1).

197. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.14(a) ("[Tjhe lawyer shall, as far as reasonably
possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.").

198. See id. r. 1.14(b).
199. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§

24(2).

200. See John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: "Volunteers," Suicide and Competency, 103

MICH. L. REV. 939, 939-40, 982 (2005) (asking whether a death row inmate who wishes to waive
his appeals should be viewed as a client accepting the justness of his punishment or as a person

seeking the aid of the state in committing suicide).
201. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
202. See Blume, supra note 200, at 945, 946.
203. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a).
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As experienced capital defense lawyers know, however, serious mental
illness is common among their clients, and even those who do not have
chronic, untreated mental illness often suffer from episodic bouts of
depression, which can temporarily interfere with their ability to make
rational decisions. 2 0 4 Many of these same clients have subsequently
expressed deep gratitude to their lawyers for not acting on instructions to
waive appeals. 2 0 5 But the law governing lawyers does not really
recognize this possibility. If anything, the law is so strongly committed
to the value of client autonomy that it goes too far in discouraging lawyers
from trying to talk sense into despondent clients or taking other actions
in the client's long-term best interest. For example, the Restatement
comments on the diminished-capacity rule warn lawyers not to infer a
disability from their clients' seemingly irrational instructions:
"Lawyers ... should be careful not to construe as proof of disability a
client's insistence on a view of the client's welfare that a lawyer considers
unwise or otherwise at variance with the lawyer's own views." 206 This is
sound advice in the mine run of cases, but in light of the prevalence of
serious mental illness and cognitive disabilities among death row
inmates, capital defense lawyers need some latitude to act on their
assessment of what is best for their clients when there is reasonable doubt
about the client's capacity to make an informed decision.
Many lawyers would object on the ground of paternalism to the
Restatement's directive to pursue the client's interests as the client would
define them "ifable to make adequately considereddecisions,"207 even if
the lawyer were acting in the utmost good faith, without any personal
bias. The lawyers who represented the Unabomber, Ted Kaczynski, and
persuaded (or tricked) him into allowing them to put on mental-status
evidence208 were not biased or incompetent-in fact, the dissenting judge
went out of his way to call them "superb" lawyers. 2 0 9 Nevertheless, they
were criticized for overriding their client's express instruction that they
not portray him as mentally ill. 2 10 As Professor David Luban argues, they
violated Kaczynski's right to be treated with dignity by "rid[ing]
roughshod over the commitments that make the client's life meaningful
and so impart dignity to it."211 Of course, they did so based on the belief
that Kaczynski's life commitments would be all for naught if the state
204. See Blume, supra note 200, at 944, 968.
205. See id. at 940.
206.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24, cmt. c.

207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. § 24(2) (emphasis added).
See United States v. Kaczynski, 239 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2001).
See id at 1121 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
Id

211.

DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 76-77 (2007).
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executed him.2 12 There are good moral arguments for both courses of
action in this case-either respecting Kaczynski's commitments even at
the expense of allowing him to participate injudicially sanctioned suicide
or overriding his commitments in an effort to save his life. Where the
lawyer is laboring under a conflict due to a prior instance of incompetent
representation, however, there is even less reason to grant decisionmaking authority to the lawyer at the expense of the client. The actions
of Kaczynzski's lawyers were admirable because their objective,
preventing his execution, is one that a rational person could share.
(Whether the judicial system should permit a seriously mentally ill person
to represent himself and thereby consent to "an execution following a trial
that lacked the fundamental elements of due process, and was farcical at
worst,"213 is a separate matter.) But there is nothing admirable about a
lawyer who overrides his client's directives out of a desire to hide his
own malpractice. This observation only sharpens the issue of the
representation of capital defendants with diminished capacity. To the
extent a lawyer has the authority to "pursue the lawyer's reasonable view
of the client's objectives or interests," 214 the capacity of the informedconsent doctrine to protect client interests is weakened. Throw in the
problem of conflicts of interest and the problem of alienation of clients
from their constitutional entitlement to effective assistance of counsel
becomes even more acute.
III. WHY CRIMINAL DEFENSE, AND PARTICULARLY CAPITAL
DEFENSE, Is DIFFERENT

The reflexive response to the Martinez problem is obvious: state postconviction counsel should not represent capital clients in subsequent
federal habeas corpus proceedings because of the possibility of conflicts
of interest. Judges should appoint new counsel to represent the client in
federal court. If the failure to raise a claim adequately, or at all, in the
state courts can transform a claim that is procedurally defaulted into one
that federal courts can entertain on the merits, then someone other than
the lawyer who represented the client in state courts- must review. the
record and conduct an investigation to see if there are any such claims.
Lawyers are generally not allowed to assess-much less litigate-the
quality of their own representation. Thus, because of the potential conflict
of interest state post-conviction counsel inevitably has, new counsel is
needed in federal habeas corpus proceedings to determine whether there
212. See id. at 77 (arguing that Kaczynski had a different theory of his case than his lawyers,
but Kaczynski eventually and reluctantly took his lawyers' advice).

213. Kaczynski, 239 F.3d at 1128 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
214. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

1998).

§

24(2) (AM. LAW INST.
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are additional claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that should
have been raised in the prior state collateral proceedings. 215 Some courts,
in fact, have taken this reflexive position. 216
But, is it always in a death row inmate's best interests for state postconviction counsel to be relieved and for new counsel to be appointed?
Clearly not; in many-if not most-jurisdictions, the number of
competent and experienced capital post-conviction counsel is quite small.
The relieved state collateral appeals attorney may be quite experienced
and very skilled, and the new lawyers that will be appointed may not be
nearly as competent. Given that it is often unknown whether anything
was overlooked in state post-conviction proceedings, and if so, whether
anything not raised is potentially meritorious, a disruption in
representation is definitely not always in the client's best interests. In
other cases, the attorney-client relationship that has developed may be so
strong that a disruption in representation could have significant adverse
effects on the client's mental state or willingness to proceed with the
appeals.2 1 7 Thus, it is not difficult to envision cases in which sticking with
long-time counsel offers the inmate the best chance to prevail and thus to
live. The difficulty lies in determining which category a particular case
falls in. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that an inmate generally
makes this type of decision with the advice of counsel, but in the cases
this Article describes, counsel is the very lawyer whose past errors may
entitle the inmate to proceed with what would otherwise be procedurally
defaulted claims.
Thus, the ethical conundrum is how to assess whether state postconviction counsel can or should continue to represent the client in
federal habeas corpus proceedings. In the abstract, it would be
215. In theory, the same analysis would apply in non-capital cases as well. But, this Article
limits its discussion to capital cases for several reasons. First, in non-capital cases, inmates seeking
state collateral relief are often unrepresented; thus, counsel will not have the opportunity to
provide substandard representation. And because non-death-sentenced inmates are not entitled to
court-appointed counsel in federal habeas corpus proceedings, most are unrepresented in federal
court as well. Thus, in the small percentage of cases where this issue arises, if counsel were to
withdraw following state post-conviction proceedings, the client would be left without any
representation. Second, despite often being "honored in the breach," this Article also falls back
on the simple reality that "death is different."

216. Owens v. Stirling, No. o:15;mc-00254-TLW-PJG (D.S.C. Aug. 13, 2015) (refusing to
appoint state PCR counsel in habeas corpus proceedings after attorney general objected to their
appointment based on a potential conflict of interest).
217. Clients who attempt to waive their appeals and submit to execution are frequently
referred to as "volunteers." Blume, supra note 200, at 940. Approximately twelve percent of all
people executed in the United States are volunteers. Id at 1008. Most have a serious mental
illness, and disruptions in relationships can trigger the decision. Id. at 962. Thus, it is not
impossible to imagine situations where a change in counsel could render a death row inmate so
distraught that he decided to "volunteer" for execution.
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theoretically possible to have independent counsel (1) review the record
of the proceedings below, (2) conduct any needed investigation, (3)
consult with the client about the pros and cons of having former counsel
continue with the representation, and (4) allow the client to make a
knowing and intelligent decision as to how to proceed.2 1 8 Again, in
theory, the client would then be in a position to decide whether to request
new counsel or to waive any potential conflict of interest arising from
continued representation, i.e., give informed consent. 2 19 But this ideal
poses several practical problems as well, such as: who will those lawyers
be, and who will compensate them? Given both the small number of
attorneys competent to represent a death-sentenced inmate in federal
habeas corpus proceedings and fiscal constraints in difficult economic
times, systemic resistance to such a proposal is not difficult to imagine.
It also raises questions of efficiency, i.e., if the court is going to pay
someone to review the files, investigate the case, and become sufficiently
"up to speed" to advise the client on the benefits and dangers of continued
representation, then why not just appoint new counsel? Courts may also
worry about the informal game-theoretic implications of Martinez, such
as whether lawyers might attempt to sandbag by committing an error in
state post-conviction proceedings that they could then subsequently raise
as a ground for filing a federal habeas petition, all with a view toward
creating delay and prolonging the life of their client.
A less cumbersome procedure would be to have independent counsel
explain to the client that inadequate assistance of state post-conviction
counsel may be a gateway to merits' review of defaulted claims of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that proceeding with current
counsel would constitute a waiver of any such claims. While better than
nothing, this hardly seems adequate for a knowing and intelligent waiver
of the potential conflict of interest. Without the type of review described
above, neither the attorney providing the "advice" nor the client will have
an accurate assessment of the risks of continuing with state postconviction counsel. Thus, it is difficult to see how any purported waiver
could in any real sense be knowing and intelligent.
Another option would be to place the initial responsibility -of
determining whether new counsel is needed on state post-conviction
counsel. Upon entering federal habeas corpus proceedings, state post218. This approach has also been used in a few cases. See, e.g., Folwer v. Joyner, 753 F.3d
446 (4th Cir. 2014); Gray v. Pearson, 526 F. App'x. 331 (4th Cir. 2013).
219. See Christeson v. Roper, 135 S. Ct. 891, 893 (2015) (depicting independent counsel
advising client not to waive the prior-work conflict by filing motion for substition). Again,
however, the situation in Christeson is somewhat anomalous because the petitioner's original,

incompetent attorneys asked two independent lawyers for advice on the case. Id. at 892. The
independent lawyers then noticed the conflict and moved for substitution of counsel. Id. at 89293. If the original two attorneys had not asked for this advice the client may never have found out
about the conflict. See id. at 892.
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conviction counsel-assuming she desires to continue representing the
client-would be required to reassess the quality of her representation in
state proceedings and then advise the client whether new counsel is
needed. However, simply to state it as an option is to expose its patent
deficiencies; state post-conviction counsel is frequently in no position to
determine whether their own performance was inadequate, particularly
given the psychological reality of having blind spots regarding one's own
ethical shortcomings. Furthermore, given the federal statute of limitations
for federal habeas petitions and rules forbidding amendments to a habeas
petition after the limitations period has expired, new counsel's hands
could be tied even if substantial issues were uncovered.2 2 0
Thus, the question remains: What to do? There are a few clear
scenarios. In cases pending in federal court, federal habeas counsel
clearly has a potential conflict of interest where:
(a) federal habeas counsel represented the petitioner in state
court; and
(b) counsel for the state has alleged that one or more claims
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel are procedurally
defaulted because they were not raised (at all or adequately)
in the state court proceedings.
In such cases, current habeas counsel must move to be relieved and
request appointment of conflict-free counsel who can assert inadequate
assistance of state post-conviction counsel as "cause" for the alleged
default unless:
(a) counsel for the state waives the procedural defense (as
this Article contends he should when there are credible
grounds for believing the defense attorney has a prior-work
conflict and independent counsel is not available );
(b) the court concludes that the claim is not in fact barred
because counsel fairly presented the claim to the state courts
or for some other reason (e.g., the alleged default is not
adequate or independent of federal law); or
(c) the court determines the claim is not "substantial"
because it patently lacks merit.
Similarly, there are instances where state post-conviction counsel
220. See infra note 230.
221. Procedural default is an affirmative defense and, as such, can be waived. Trest v. Cain,
522 U.S. 87, 89 (1997) ("[P]rocedural default is normally a 'defense' that the State is 'obligated
to raise' and 'preserv[e]' if it is not to 'lose the right to assert the defense thereafter."' (alteration

in original)).
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intends to continue as federal habeas counsel and the federal courts have
appointed that counsel under the Criminal Justice Act pursuant to the
Supreme Court's decision in McFarlandv. Scott,222 and in the course of
preparing the petition for writ of habeas corpus discovers one or more
potential claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that were not
raised in the state collateral proceedings (or not raised adequately). In
these instances, counsel has an obligation to inform the court and the
client and to ask the court to appoint counsel who is not laboring under a
potential conflict of interest for, at a minimum, the purpose of advising
the clients of the pros and cons of proceeding with current counsel. If the
court denies the request, counsel is obligated to file a motion to be
relieved based upon the potential conflict of interest. Only if the court
denies the motion should counsel continue with the federal
representation.
These scenarios (and Martinez itself) raise a more fundamental issue:
if state post-conviction counsel intends to continue representing a capital
client in subsequent federal habeas corpus proceedings (after explaining
the Martinez equitable "exception" to the client and ascertaining that the
client wants counsel to continue), does counsel have an affirmative
obligation to actually investigate the quality of their prior state court
representation to assess-in the parlance of Martinez-itsadequacy? The
answer to this is also clear. Yes, counsel does. As counterintuitive as it
may seem at first blush, in the post-Martinez world, where the failure to
raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims in state post-conviction
proceedings can be excused if the omission was the result of deficient
post-conviction representation, the continuing duty of loyalty to the client
demands that such an inquiry be undertaken. It would be best if
experienced post-conviction counsel could be obtained to do the record
review and conduct the investigation, but little about capital postconviction representation reflects best practices. Courts are reluctant to
fund such work, and experienced post-conviction counsel are overworked
and cannot and should not be expected to perform the work for free. Thus,
in such situations counsel will simply have no alternative but to attempt
to assess the quality of their previous representation-honestly and
candidly, with an awareness of the possibility of self-serving or impartial
judgments.2 2 3
222. 512 U.S. 849, 855 (1994) (holding that death-sentenced inmates have a right to have
counsel appointed prior to filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus).

223. At the risk of over-complicating an already over-complicated set of possible scenarios,
this investigation must also take place in a sufficiently timely manner to discern the existence of
any additional, previously unraised claims before the statute of limitations for federal habeas
petitions expires. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (2012) (requiring a federal petition to be filed within one
year of the case becoming "final" on direct review subject to tolling during "properly filed" state
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Many readers are likely now scratching their heads and wondering
who created such an arcane set of doctrines that inexorably lead to what
in any other context would be considered absurd practices and results that
can literally result in someone with a meritorious claim being executed.
It is not a hyperbole to classify the current regime as "Kafkaesque." For
the most part, fault lies with the Supreme Court. The Court's creation of
a number of doctrines, e.g., procedural default, ostensibly to promote
comity and federalism but clearly intended to limit the availability of
federal habeas corpus to state prisoners and especially death-sentenced
inmates has made habeas practice both complicated and unforgiving. 2 2 4
Congress also must take its share of the blame for the habeas
modifications contained in AEDPA. Numerous scholars-and even
Supreme Court Justices-have commented on the statute's shoddiness,
which has in turn created numerous interpretive questions courts are still
sorting out almost twenty years after its enactment. 2 25 And finally, state
legislatures and courts, which have refused to appoint and compensate
competent counsel in state post-conviction proceedings, also must take
their share of the blame. But the purpose of this Article is not primarily
to look backward and assess blame for the current "pickle" the legal
community is in, but to look forward and, at least in this particular corner
of the habeas imbroglio, offer some possible solutions.
One solution to the hall-of-mirrors problem created by Martinez is to
take some of the pressure off defense counsel to be the only institutional
actor with a responsibility to ensure that capital cases are decided fairly
on the merits. 2 2 6 This Article suggests that states' attorneys and federal
post-conviction proceedings). Some courts have held-nonsensically-that Martinez's equitable
exception for otherwise procedurally defaulted claims is not an exception to the limitations period.

See, e.g., Lambrix v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 756 F.3d 1246, 1262 (11th Cir. 2014) ("Martinez does
not alter the statutory bar against filing untimely § 2554 petitions."). Furthermore, in Mayle v.
Felix, the Supreme Court held that a defendant could not amend a habeas petition after the
limitations period expires to include claims unrelated to those in the timely filed petition. 545 U.S.

644, 650 (2005).
224. For a more detailed discussion of the Court's handiwork in this area, see John H. Blume,

AEDPA: The "Hype" and the "Bite, " 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 265-70 (2006).
225. See, e.g., LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS: HABEAS CORPUS 57 (2003) ("AEDPA
is notorious for its poor drafting. The Act is replete with vague and ambiguous language, apparent
inconsistency, and plain bad grammar."). Justice David Souter remarked that "in a world of silk
purses and pigs' ears, the Act is not a silk purse of the art of statutory drafting." Lindh v. Murphy,

521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997).
226. Another partial solution beyond the scope of this Article would be to require the
appointment and adequate compensation of experienced, competent counsel in state postconviction proceedings and to provide reasonable funds for investigative and expert assistance.

Most states do not provide either appointment or funding, even in capital cases. Raising the overall
quality of state post-conviction representation would necessarily reduce the number of viable

claims of inadequate post-conviction representation.
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judges have an important role to play in this context. Bear in mind, it is a
state's invocation of the affirmative defense of procedural default-in an
effort to prevent a federal judge from reaching the merits of a potentially
meritorious ineffective assistance of counsel claim-that creates the
procedural morass this Article has described. This in turn can lead to both
inefficient litigation and unjust results. Thus, in most instances, if
attorneys for the state agreed-either on their own or after being "leaned
on" by the court-to waive procedural default and allow the court to
proceed to the merits, litigation would proceed expeditiously and without
the ethical taint of potential and actual conflicts of interest.2 2 7 If the
claims are not bona fide, the court will reject them.
On the other hand, if the issues not previously raised are meritorious,
then there are no true "losers," except possibly those people who ascribe
to the view that death sentences resulting from a trial infected with
prejudicial constitutional error should be carried out. The responsibility
of avoiding the types of potential conflicts of interest this Article has
noted lies not solely with counsel for condemned inmates. The other
systemic and repeat players-states' attorneys and judges-also must do
their part. As argued above, much of the mess created by the Supreme
Court resulted from its inconsistent approaches to the problem of
reconciling defense counsel duties arising under the Sixth Amendment
with the state rules of professional conduct.2 28 In cases such as Whiteside
and Strickland, the Court took pains to avoid interfering with the
profession's capacity to self-regulate to protect clients and serve the
public interest. But when ethically conscientious defense lawyers
conclude that they have a conflict under the state rules of professional
conduct because their clients may have a Sixth Amendment right to a
merits' review of a procedurally defaulted claim, courts should not
consider this a problem of defense lawyers' making and leave it to them
to muddle through. The Court cannot consistently say, as it did in Cuyler,
that the federal courts rely on defense lawyers to comply with their ethical
obligation to detect and avoid conflicts of interest while leaving lawyers
and their clients helpless when they do raise a conflict.

227. Furthermore, these same attorneys general are often (at least partially) the cause of the
alleged state procedural default. Many lawyers for the state routinely oppose state post-conviction

counsel's request for funding, time to conduct adequate investigations, and production of
documents and other information that could lead to the identification of potentially meritorious
issues. And, in some states, lawyers for the state even write the orders denying state postconviction relief, filling those orders with erroneous procedural default determinations. Thus, in
equity terms-and Martinez is at bottom an equitable doctrine-in many cases the lawyers
representing the State have "unclean hands."
228. See supra Part 1l.
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CONCLUSION

Martinez forces courts to grapple with a problem that civil lawyers
have always faced, with a significant difference. Most of the cases in Part
III illustrating the prior-work conflicts problem arose in the context of
legal malpractice claims asserted by clients of the law firms with a
conflict. The ever-present threat of a malpractice suit has given rise to
mitigating procedures, such as in-house ethics advisors who are
sufficiently independent of the lawyers in their own firm to be able to
give advice and take advantage of the attorney-client privilege when
communicating with the lawyers who are providing the representation. 2 2 9
It also alerts lawyers to the fact that they are not particularly reliable
judges of the competence of their own performance. Mitigating the risk
of malpractice liability has thus led to the creation of practices that serve
to protect client interests in the long run. Without the threat of civil
liability, however, criminal lawyers do not have the same incentive to
establish procedures to ensure their independence. 2 3 0 The cost of noncompliance with conflicts rules is, in effect, externalized to courts and
state prosecutors. Courts will be faced with motions for substitution of
counsel or the appointment of independent counsel to evaluate the
performance of state post-conviction counsel; states' attorneys general
will have to deal with the possibility of further delay while the conflict
issue is adjudicated. Standard law-and-economics analysis suggests that
these institutional actors now have an incentive to minimize the expense
and disruption caused by the Martinez doctrine. 2 3 1 Moreover, the
Constitution may require them to work toward some kind of cooperative
solution. Defense counsel cannot solve this problem on their own. Thus,
229. See Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical
Infrastructurein Large Law Firms: A CallforResearch and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L. REv. 691,
692 (2002) ("[Ajnecdotal evidence suggests that large law firms increasingly rely on in-house

ethics advisors, firm general counsel, and other internal specialists to manage the firm's
compliance with ethics and malpractice regulation.").
230. Malpractice remedies for criminal defendants are generally unavailable because of
causation doctrines. As a tort (negligence) cause of action, legal malpractice requires a showing
of factual, but-for causation. The position of a majority of jurisdictions, with respect to factual
causation, is that showing that a different outcome would have resulted if the lawyer had not been
negligent would require a showing of factual innocence. That means the defendant in the criminal
action must first have the conviction set aside, on direct or collateral review, before bringing a
malpractice action against the lawyer. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 53, cmt. D (AM. LAW INST. 1998). A leading case is Peeler v. Hughes & Luce, 909
S.W.2d 494, 498 (Tex. 1995) ("We therefore hold that, as a matter of law, it is the illegal conduct

rather than the negligence of a convict's counsel that is the cause in fact of any injuries flowing
from the conviction, unless the conviction has been overturned."). As a practical matter, this
means that civil malpractice actions-as opposed to Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness claims-

are greatly under-litigated.
231. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, EcoNoMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.1, at 179 (5th ed. 1998).
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this Article's tentatively hopeful conclusion to this exploration of the
Martinez conundrum is that the institutional actors with a stake in
procedures and outcomes will work together to ensure that credible
claims of inadequate state post-conviction representation are investigated
competently, that clients are fully informed and involved in the decisionmaking process, and ultimately that clients' wishes are respected. As the
Court itself has repeatedly emphasized, the role of defense counsel must
be understood in an institutional context; the constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel must be respected "not for its own sake,
but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a
fair trial." 23 2 If equity requires that a defendant is guaranteed reasonably
competent state post-conviction representation, then judges and
prosecutors-in addition to defense counsel-share responsibility for
ensuring that this right is recognized.

232. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984).

